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Beginning to Learn How to End: Lessons on
Completion Strategies, Residual Mechanisms,
and Legacy Considerations from Ad Hoc
International Criminal Tribunals to the
International Criminal Court
DAFNA GOZANI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Countries recovering from widespread human rights violations
face the challenge of restoring civic trust in the domestic rule of law,
repairing the social fabric of society, and building a foundation for longterm peace and reconciliation.1 Although the creation of international
criminal courts and tribunals has been a positive step towards “advancing a global system of ending impunity for the most serious crimes,”
their creation alone is insufficient to promote a just and lasting resolution of conflict.2 The international community must take steps to ensure
that the contributions of international tribunals are not undermined or
reversed by the manner in which they close their operations and that
their legacy is preserved.3

* J.D., Loyola Law School, 2013. I would like to thank No Peace Without Justice for allowing me
to see firsthand the wonderful impact civil society can have in the fight against impunity, Professor Cesare P.R. Romano, Professor David Glazier, Professor Anna Spain, and Laura Cadra for
enriching my international law education, the dedicated staff of Loyola’s International and Comparative Law Review for their helpful feedback during the editing process, and my family and
friends for their support and encouragement.
1. Stakeholders Convene on Legacy of the SCSL, EXPLORING THE LEGACY OF THE
SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://scsl-legacy.ictj.org/about-project (last visited Jan. 25,
2013) [hereinafter Stakeholders Convene on Legacy of the SCSL].
2. Caitlin Reiger, Where to from Here for International Tribunals? Considering Legacy
and Residual Issues, INT’L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1, 5 (Sept. 2009),
http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Legacy-Tribunal-2009-English.pdf.
3. Id.
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The legacy of an international criminal tribunal is its “lasting impact on bolstering the rule of law in a particular society, by conducting
effective trials to contribute to ending impunity, while also strengthening domestic capacity.”4 Thus, as former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi
Annan stated, “it is essential that, from the moment any future international or hybrid tribunal is established, considerations be given, as a priority, to the ultimate exit strategy and intended legacy in the country
concerned.”5
The idea of an international court first came about in the aftermath
of World War II.6 At the conclusion of the war, the Allies set up the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals to try Axis war criminals.7 In 1948, the
U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution inviting the International
Law Commission (ILC) to study the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of individuals and
groups charged with genocide or crimes with similar gravity.8 Despite
the ILC having drafted a statute in the early 1950s, the Cold War derailed these efforts; “the General Assembly effectively abandoned the
effort pending agreement on a definition for the crime of aggression and
an International Code of Crimes.”9
Generally, there are three generations of criminal bodies. The first
generation includes the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals; the second
generation includes the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR); and lastly, the third generation includes the International Criminal Court and the hybrid criminal bodies, which includes the Special

4. Robin Vincent, An Administrative Practices Manual for Internationally Assisted Criminal Justice Institutions, INT’L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1, 151 (2007),
http://wcjp.unicri.it/proceedings/docs/ICTJ_Admin%20Manual%20Criminal%20Justice_2007_en
g.pdf.
5. U.N. Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Postconflict Societies, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004), available at
http://www.unrol.org/files/2004%20report.pdf.
6. Claire Calzonetti, Frequently Asked Questions about the International Criminal Court,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, http://www.cfr.org/courts-and-tribunals/frequently-askedquestions-international-criminal-court/p8981 (last updated July 23, 2012).
7. Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AM SOC. INT’L L. 551, 554–55 (2006).
8. See ANTONIO CASSESSE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 17 (2008).
9. History of the ICC, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIM. COURT,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=icchistory (last visited on Jan. 25, 2015). The International Criminal Court, PROJECT ON INT’L COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, http://www.pict-pcti.org/courts/ICC.html
(last visited on Sept. 7, 2014).
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Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL).10 In the 1990s, the first ad hoc criminal
tribunals were established in response to the atrocities committed in the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.11 The international community,
through the U.N. Security Council, created the ICTY and the ICTR in
1993 and 1994, respectively.12 In 2002, the U.N., in cooperation with
the Sierra Leone government, set up a new type of court in response to
the mass killings and other human rights violations in Sierra Leone: the
SCSL, a hybrid, ad hoc international criminal tribunal that combined the
characteristics of both a national and international court.13
While these three institutions were each unique, they all had one
major feature in common: they were temporary.14 Thus, while the SCSL
differs from the ICTY and ICTR by being a hybrid institution, for the
purposes of this note, these three institutions will be referred to as ad
hoc international criminal courts.15 The SCSL was the first of the three
to complete its mandate;16 the ICTY and the ICTR are expected to complete their mandates in the upcoming year.17 The closure of these tribunals, their residual mechanisms, and their attempts to establish a positive legacy will not only serve as examples for other existing and future
ad hoc tribunals, but will also provide valuable lessons for the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “the Court”); the first permanent international court and the first court with global application.18
Since the first of the post-Cold War ad hoc criminal tribunals only
recently completed its mandate,19 developing the best practices for com10. Hybrid Courts, THE PROJECT ON INT’L COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, http://www.pictpcti.org/courts/hybrid.html (last visited July 15, 2014).
11. Ad hoc Tribunals, THE INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS (Oct. 29, 2010),
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/international-criminal-jurisdiction/ad-hoctribunals/overview-ad-hoc-tribunals.htm.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Hybrid Courts, supra note 10.
15. Id. (Other examples of hybrid institutions are the Crimes Panels of the District Court of
Dili,”Regulation 64” Panels in the Courts of Kosovo, and the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia.)
16. Charles Chemor Jalloh, The Sierra Leon Special Court and Its Legacy (Mar. 13, 2014),
http://www.cambridgeblog.org/2014/03/the-sierra-leone-special-court-and-its-legacy; see also
Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone Outreach and Public Affairs Office, Special Court
Hands Over Courthouse and Complex to the Government of Sierra Leone (Dec. 2, 2013), available at http://www.rscsl.org/Documents/Press/2013/pressrelease-120213a.pdf [hereinafter Special
Court Press Release].
17. Kevin Jon Heller, Completion Strategies, in THE INT’L PROSECUTORS 11-12 (2012).
CRIM.
COURT,
http://www.icc18. ICC
at
a
Glance,
INT’L
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/ICCAtAGlanceEng.pdf (last visited July 18, 2014).
19. Special Court Press Release, supra note 16.
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pletion strategies, residual mechanisms, and legacy considerations are
still in their beginning stages.20 As one member of the Special Court of
Sierra Leone’s Management Committee recently said, “we have been
successful in establishing tribunals. We must be as successful in ending
them.”21
This note will argue that the ICC should take a broad approach to
legacy by fostering affected communities’ ownership and understanding
of the judicial proceedings, promoting reconciliation, and prioritizing
restorative over retributive justice. A broader conception of legacy
would place a greater emphasis on facilitating a path toward sustainable
peace.22 In addition, this approach would not be limited to the victims or
witnesses of human rights violations; rather, it acknowledges the impact
that mass crimes have on future generations and the implication about
the possibilities for future societal reconciliation.23 As emphasized by
the Honorable Judge Vagn Joensen, President of the ICTR, “[n]ot only
must justice be done, it must also be seen to be done.”24 In order to maximize the ICC’s potential, the international community needs to engage
in and prioritize legacy planning from the outset of its activities.25
20. About The Mechanism, U.N. MECHANISM FOR INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNALS,
http://www.unmict.org/about.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2012) [hereinafter About The Mechanism]; Home, EXPLORING THE LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://scsllegacy.ictj.org/about-project (last visited Feb. 23, 2013) [hereinafter EXPLORING THE LEGACY];
see also Daryl A. Mundis, Completing the Mandates of the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals: Lessons from the Nuremberg Process?, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 591 (2005) (discussing the
challenges facing the closing of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
21. Heller, supra note 17 (internal quotations omitted).
22. The more conservative approach of legacy tends to prioritize activities such as
knowledge transfer between international and national staff, as well as training and facilitating
legal reform. Alison Cole, What is the International Criminal Court’s Legacy?, THIS IS SIERRA
LEONE (July 17, 2012), http://www.thisissierraleone.com/what-is-the-legacy-of-the-internationalcriminal-court.
23. For more information about the intergenerational transmission of trauma and its negative
impact on the formation of cultural identity and reconciliation, see ALEXANDER A. LUPIS,
SCHOLAR RESEARCH BRIEF: INTER-GENERATION TRANSMISSION OF TRAUMA IN CROATIA:
VETERANS FAMILIES 20 YEARS AFTER THE SIEGE OF VUKOVAR, IREX 4 (2011); Yael Danieli,
Recovery after Mass Crimes, in THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PEACE (Nigel J. Young ed.,
Oxford
Univ.
Press
2010),
available
at
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195334685.001.0001/acref9780195334685-e-609.
24. Judge Vagn Joensen, The Legacy of the Ad Hoc Tribunals and the Future of InternaYOUTUBE
(Nov.
13,
2013),
tional
Criminal
Justice,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QPBF_l3tYsI&list=WLuZ0b-NS3V6lIzTKHtI3pybaWILWGCMX.
25. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rule-of-Law Tools
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This note will also discuss the legacy lessons that the ICC can
learn from the closing of the three ad hoc international criminal courts
(the ICTY, the ICTR, and the SCSL). While the ICC is a permanent institution, it will still disengage from the situation countries once the trials are completed; therefore, it has much to gain by looking to the experiences of the ad hoc courts, which were established as temporary
institutions from the outset.26 The ICC’s greatest challenges will be encouraging local ownership of the trials, increasing the rule of law, and
helping to repair the shredded fabric of society after horrific widespread
human rights violations. To preserve the legacy of the ICC’s work, the
Court’s focus must go beyond simply trials and convictions; it must instead focus on strengthening the rule of law and helping to establish the
foundation for lasting peace.
Part I of this note will provide a general overview of completion
strategies, residual issues, and legacy considerations. Part II of this note
will provide a very brief background on the ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL,
and discuss their utilization of completions strategies in approaching residual issues and legacy considerations. Part III will examine how the
ICC can incorporate lessons from the experiences of the ad hoc international criminal courts and will argue that, for the ICC to achieve its full
potential, it needs to embrace a broader conception of legacy. Finally,
Part IV will conclude that, regardless of an international court’s permanent or temporary nature, the prioritization of completion plans, residual
mechanisms, and legacy strategies through focusing on the affected
community’s needs are essential to protecting these institution’s legacy
and work.
II. COMPLETION STRATEGIES, RESIDUAL FUNCTIONS, AND LEGACY
CONSIDERATIONS
International ad hoc criminal courts and tribunals are “transitory
investments in providing justice, intended to provide what the domestic
justice systems cannot deliver alone due to a lack of capacity, independence, or political will, resulting in part from the legacy of the conflict.”27
for Post-Conflict States: Maximizing the Legacy of Hybrid Courts, at 16, U.N. Doc.
HR/PUB/08/2 (2008), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HybridCourts.pdf [hereinafter Rule-of-Law Tools].
26. A situation country is the location where the alleged violations took place. For more
information, see Situations and Cases, INT’L CRIM. COURT, http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx
(last
visited Sept. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Situations and Cases].
27. Reiger, supra note 2, at 1.
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Unlike domestic courts, the international community expects international criminal courts and tribunals “to assist in the transformation of
post-conflict societies, or at the very least,” to establish a legacy that
will stimulate some positive transformation.28 Upon completion of its
judicial proceedings, each institution faces three interrelated challenges:
completion strategies, residual issues, and legacy considerations.
Some scholars argue that “[l]egacy must be domestically owned
and driven. A hybrid or international tribunal should be viewed not as a
driver but as a catalyst in terms of motivating a broader set of initiatives.”29 However, in contrast to legacy issues, there are some residual
functions that simply cannot be “domestically owned and driven.”30
Thus, while it is important to encourage input from affected communities and inform them of completion strategies, there are also some instances in which the court must handle the residual mechanisms exclusively, at least in the beginning of their implementation.
A. Completion Strategies
Completion strategies refer to the court or tribunal’s work leading
up to its closing, which includes the preparation work to handle residual
issues that arise from the institution’s closure.31 Completion is important
for ensuring the credibility and perceived legitimacy of these courts and
tribunals. It would be harmful for an institution with a goal to pursue the
end of impunity to continue indefinitely.32
In theory, it is logical for any institution undertaking proceedings
with a limited timeframe to begin to plan for its eventual closure at the
earliest stage possible.33 However, because of the complicated and detailed nature of the proceedings, these institutions typically begin to address such issues after trial proceedings are already underway.34 In a
framework of limited resources, it is inevitable that these institutions
will be pressured to conclude their operations based on financial con28. Mohamed Suma, The Charles Taylor Trial and Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone for Sierra Leone, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1, 1 (Sept. 2009), available at
http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-SierraLeone-Special-Court-2009-English.pdf.
29. Vincent, supra note 4, at 151.
30. Gabriel Oosthuizen, Open Society Justice Initiative, The Residual Functions of the U.N.
International Criminal Tribunals of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the Special Court for
Sierra Leone: The Potential Role of the International Criminal Court, 1, 5 (Sept. 30, 2008) (unpublished draft), available at http://www.iclsfoundation.org.
31. Id. at 5.
32. Id.
33. Vincent, supra note 4, at 145.
34. See id.
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siderations; as a result, a very real danger exists that financial considerations will drive the judicial process.35 Therefore, it is particularly important that the planning happens early and in a transparent manner so
investors can understand the institution’s methodology and allow the
focus to remain on the needs of the affected community, where it belongs.
Because these institutions are generally a response of the preceding conflict that necessitated the involvement of an international criminal court or tribunal, they are unable to rely on domestic judicial systems to continually enforce court orders, supervise lengthy prison terms,
and provide on-going witness protection.36 As a result, the closing such
institutions raises long-term planning concerns.
By understanding that these ad hoc tribunals would eventually end,
the conception of their completion strategies is typically described in
terms of three milestones: first, the conclusion of every prosecutorial
investigation; second, “the end of all first instance trials;” and finally,
third, the “conclusion of all appeals from trial judgments.”37 Completion
strategies are also interconnected with residual mechanisms and legacy
planning because they set out the required residual mechanisms necessary to ensure that the court’s work and legacy will not be undone after
it closes.
B. Residual Issues and Mechanisms
Residual issues refer to the enduring tasks of on-going legal and
moral obligations to those directly affected by the tribunals after the tribunals close.38 “[A]s a matter of principle, [residual mechanisms] should
not only be consistent with the founding [of closing] documents, but also further the objectives of these courts.”39 Indeed, this entails some
very important responsibilities as matters of life or death and the protection of fundamental human rights are sometimes involved.40 The main
35. Id.
36. Reiger, supra note 2, at 2.
37. Thomas Wayde Pittman, The Road to the Establishment of the International Residual
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 797, 798–99 (2011).
38. Reiger, supra note 2, at 2.
39. Briefing paper from Marieke Wierda and Caitlin Reiger of ICTJ’s Criminal Justice Program to the ICTJ and the University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law, Closing the International
and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals: Mechanisms to Address Residual Issues, INT’L CTR. FOR
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 4 (Feb. 1, 2010), available at http://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJGlobal-Tribunal-Residual-2010-English.pdf [hereinafter Closing the International and Hybrid
Criminal Tribunals].
40. Gabriel Oosthuizen and Robert Schaeffer, Complete justice: Residual functions and po-

GOZANI_FINAL_FOR_PUB

338

4/4/2015 12:55 PM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 36:331

purpose for establishing a residual mechanism “is to ensure that the
closing of the Tribunals will not result in impunity for those ‘responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.’”41 Residual
mechanisms have the potential “to create a safe space within which
those traumatized by their experiences may overcome them.”42
Since the international community has undertaken the responsibility to establish such institutions, it also has the responsibility of closing
them. As the Honourable Justice Shireen Avis Fisher, President of the
SCSL, stated, “residual responsibilities are not an afterthought or burden. They are an essential part of the ongoing struggle against impunity:
to insure that witnesses continue to be protected, archives continue to be
preserved, and the supervision of persons convicted by the Special
Court continue to meet international standards.”43
The majority of residual functions will involve some combination
of judicial, registry, defense, and prosecutorial activities.44 Judicial functions include activities performed by judicial officers “with the authority
to make legal assessments and issue binding decisions . . . .”45 The registries’ functions include “administer[ing] and servic[ing] the courts;” this
also includes the components of the prosecution and the defense.46 The
registries are responsible for a broad range of activities such as providing witness protection services, managing issues with personnel, providing security and language services, operating as the court’s channel of
communication, and managing records.47 The residual function workload is likely to be the heaviest right after the court closes, but it will

tential residual mechanisms of the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, 3 HAGUE JUST. J. 48, 50 (2008), available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/HJJ-JJH/Vol_3(1)/Residual_functions_EN.pdf.
41. See Catherine Denis, Critical Overview of Residual Functions’ of the Mechanisms and
its Date of Commencement (including Transitional Arrangements), 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 819,
822 (2011) (citing Security Council’s resolutions establishing the ICTY S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/808 (February 22, 1993), and the Security Council’s Resolution establishing the ICTR,
S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (August 28, 2003); see also the resolution establishing the
IRMCT S.C. Res. 1966, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1966 (December 22, 2010).
42. Leila Nadya Sadat, The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
WHITNEY R. HARRIS WORLD LAW INSTITUTE 1, 18 (July 3, 2012),
http://law.wustl.edu/harris/documents/ICTRLecture-LegacyAd%20HocTribunals9.12.12.pdf.
43. Tenth Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (June 2012‒
May 2013), http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=G5p0a%2fK95Sc%3d&tabid=176
[hereinafter Tenth Annual Report].
44. Oosthuizen & Schaeffer, supra note 40, at 51-52.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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decrease with time.48
Due to the temporary nature of ad hoc tribunals, residual mechanisms are necessary to review proceedings and new evidence or try suspects years after cases have been closed.49 This function is essential to
preserving an international tribunal’s legacy. Without it, human rights
violators could simply wait out the charges against them, which “risk[s]
reinforcing impunity and undermining efforts to re-establish the rule of
law.”50 A recent example occurred on January 2013 when a French
Court ruled in favour of a Rwandan extradition request for genocide
suspect, Innocent Musabyimana.51 Such mechanisms are also important
for transferring prosecutorial duties and classified documents to the national level, assuring that the witness protection programs continue,
preventing future human rights violations, protecting the rights of the
accused, and overseeing the establishment of public archives.52 Residual
mechanisms also serve to handle any appellate proceedings that may
arise after the closure of the court.53
Effective residual mechanisms not only have an impact on that
specific tribunal or court’s work, but also on other institutions’ work.
For instance, witnessing a court’s failure to effectively ensure the protection of its victims and witnesses will likely discourage others from
engaging in the work of other international courts such as the ICC.54
Correspondingly, such residual mechanisms are also connected to the
court’s legacy in that they are a way for the court to be remembered.55
C. Legacy Considerations
Legacy issues are not easy to define; there have been questions as
to what stage these issues should be addressed, how to assess their completion and success, and who would have the responsibility for carrying
them out.56 There has also been some debate as to whether legacy issues
48.
49.
50.
51.

Oosthuizen, supra note 30, at 5.
See Reiger, supra note 2, at 2.
Id. at 2.
Rwanda: French Court Grants Rwandan Extradition Request, HIRONDELLE NEWS
AGENCY (Jan. 30, 2013), http://allafrica.com/stories/201301310074.html.
52. Closing the International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals, supra note 39, at 5-6.
53. The Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (ICTY), http://www.icty.org/sid/10874 (last visited July 18, 2014).
54. Oosthuizen & Schaeffer, supra note 40, at 52.
CRIM.
COURT,
http://icc55. Situations
and
Cases,
INT’L
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx
(last
visited July 18, 2014).
56. Gabriel Oosthuizen, The Residual Functions of the UN International Criminal Tribu-
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extend beyond completion and residual issues.57 “At the core of legacy
should be the concept of sustainability—how to maxim[z]e international
interventions in the aftermath of mass atrocities and make a permanent
contribution to a country’s capacity to try massive crimes.”58 An international court’s or tribunal’s capacity and strength in preventing human
rights violations, protecting witnesses, and performing duties involved
in transferring cases will partially determine its legacy.59
A conservative approach to legacy planning focuses a court’s energy on strengthening the rule of law with an emphasis on enhancing
national capacity.60 Courts enhance national capacity by employing the
“demonstration effect.”61 This refers to the role an international tribunal
or court plays in demonstrating by example and contributes to a cultural
shift “through increased rights awareness and increased calls for accountability.”62 The conservative approach prioritizes transferring
knowledge “between international and national staff [as well as] training and facilitating legal reform.63 While this approach seeks to create a
cultural shift and increase human rights awareness, it does not emphasize the need to directly interact with the affected community.64
Alternatively, a broader approach to legacy, mainly supported by
civil society, places a greater emphasis on facilitating the path towards
reconciliation through direct interaction with the public.65 Some activities under this broader conception of legacy include: “preserving public
records and materials for posterity;” promoting the long-term positive
impact of the courts’ work; outreaching to affected communities and
explaining the court’s work; and developing and reaffirming the rule of
law through enhancing human and institutional capacities.66 Generally,
nals of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the Special Court for Sierra Leone: the Potential
Role of the International Criminal Court ¶ 19 (Int’l Criminal Law Servs., Open Soc’y Justice Initiative, Briefing Paper, 2008) [hereinafter The residual functions of the UN International Criminal tribunals].
57. Oosthuizen, supra note 30, at 5.
58. Vincent, supra note 4, at 154.
59. Gabrielle McIntyre, The International Residual Mechanism and the Legacy of International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 926
(2011).
60. The main proponents of this approach are the entities financing the court, such as the
United Nations or the national government. Cole, supra note 22.
61. Vincent, supra note 4, at 153.
62. Id.
63. Cole, supra note 22.
64. Id.
65. See generally id.
66. Oosthuizen, supra note 30, at 5.
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such an approach does not view legacy in terms of legal accomplishments and successful prosecutions, but in terms of reconciliation and
transitional justice.
The Preamble to the Rome Statute, the ICC’s founding document,
supports this conception of legacy, by stating that “grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world,” it is evident that the
ICC recognizes the interdependent relationship between accountability
and stability.67 The Preamble also states that the ICC was established “to
put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to
contribute to the prevention of such crimes. . . . for the sake of present
and future generations;” this implies that in addition to its prosecutorial
function, another one of the ICC’s roles is to affect future conduct.68
Some argue that the ICC should play an even greater role in restorative
and transitional justice “by promoting issues like reconciliation, which
also contributes to restoration.”69 This approach also finds support in
some of the founding documents of the ICC’s predecessors. For example, the statute establishing the ICTR states that the intention of the
court was to contribute to “the process of national reconciliation and to
the restoration and maintenance of peace” by ensuring redress for the
most serious violations.70
Another measure of the court’s legacy is “the extent to which they
have contributed to public perceptions and debates about events that
took place during the conflict.”71 It should be recognized that there is a
connection and overlapping purposes for residual mechanisms and legacy strategies. For example, a U.N. Secretary-General’s report noted that
the “primary use of the archives of a tribunal will be not just for the residual mechanisms that succeed them, but also for national authorities
that may seek to conduct further investigations.”72 That report also
“acknowledges that there is an important secondary value of preserving
archives ‘for memory, education, and research.’”73 Ultimately, the legacy of an international court or tribunal should “lay the groundwork for
67. Cole, supra note 22 (citing Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 126,
July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 1002, 1068 (1998)).
68. Jeremy Sarkin, Enhancing the Legitimacy, Status, and the Role of the International
Criminal Court Globally by Using Transactional Justice and Restorative Justice Strategies, 6
INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS. L. 83, 86 (2011-2012).
69. Id. at 90.
70. Closing the International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals, supra note 39, at 4 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
71. Reiger, supra note 2, at 5.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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future efforts to prevent a recurrence of crimes by offering precedents
for legal reform, building faith in judicial processes, and promoting
greater civic engagement on issues of accountability and justice.”74
III. AD HOC CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS AND THE SPECIAL COURT OF SIERRA
LEONE
The last decade of the twentieth century experienced major advancements in international criminal justice with regards to the creation
and establishment of ad hoc criminal tribunals and hybrid criminal tribunals such as the ICTY, the ICTR, and the SCSL.75 While the ICTY,
ICTR, and the SCSL are all unique, one common feature stands: each is
an ad hoc institution created specifically to address a particular situation.76 The SCSL was the first of the three to complete its mandate.77
The ICTY and the ICTR are expected to complete their mandates in the
next two years. The SCSL had the benefit of learning from the critiques
of the ICTY and the ICTR, thus this note primarily focus on its legacy
preservation activities. However, a short discussion of the ICTY and the
ICTR will explain some of issues that the ICC will face in shaping a
legacy strategy.78
A. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
1. Historical Background and Completion Strategy of the ICTY
Beginning in 1991, political developments in what used to be the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia resulted in a number of violent
conflicts and widespread violations of international criminal law committed against civilians such as deportations, mass executions, ethnic
cleansing, mass sexual assaults, and rapes.79
74. Id. at 1.
75. See Sarkin, supra note 68, at 85.
76. Hybrid Courts, PROJECT ON INT’L COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, http://www.pictpcti.org/courts/hybrid.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2014).
77. Special Court for Sierra Leone: Its History and Jurisprudence, SPECIAL COURT FOR
SIERRA LEONE, http://www.rscsl.org/ (last visited July 18, 2014).
78. For an in depth discussion on the ICTY’s legacy, see Guido Acquaviva, ‘Best Before
Date Shown’: Residual Mechanisms at the ICTY, in THE LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 507-36 (Bert Zwart, Alexander Zahar &
Göran Sluiter eds., 2011). For an in-depth discussion on the ICTR’s legacy, see Cecile Aptel,
Closing the U.N. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Completion Strategy and Residual
Issues, 14 NEW ENG. J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 169, 169-85 (2008).
79. ROBERT CRYER ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
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The U.N. Security Council created the ICTY in 1993 when the
conflict in the former Yugoslavia was still underway.80 The ICTY was
designed to contribute to “the restoration and maintenance of peace” by
ensuring redress for the most serious violations.81 The court tried four
types of crimes: genocide; crimes against humanity; violations of the
laws and customs of war; and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.82
By the end of 2013, the ICTY indicted 161 persons in total and
concluded 141 cases.83 There were ongoing proceedings for twenty of
the accused – sixteen before the appeals chamber, and four at the trial
level.84 The ICTY had sentenced seventy-four people—seventeen of
whom were transferred, fifty of whom served their sentences, and three
who died while serving their sentences.85 In addition, the court transferred thirteen individuals to countries in the former Yugoslavia for trial
pursuant to Rule 11 bis, and enforced sentences in thirteen different
states.86 Thirty-six of the accused either had their indictments withdrawn
or died.87
It was not until seven years after the ICTY was established that it
seriously began to discuss how it would conclude its work.88 Two years
later, in 2002, the ICTY President Claude Jorda submitted the first
ICTY completion strategy with plans for the ICTY to complete its mandate by 2010.89 Subsequently, in 2003, the Security Council adopted a
resolution to treat the completion strategies of the ICTY and the ICTR
jointly, calling on both courts “to take all possible measures to complete
investigations by the end of 2004, to complete all trial activities at first
PROCEDURE 122 (2d. ed. 2010).
80. Id.
81. Closing the International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals, supra note 39, at 4.
82. Infographic: ICTY Facts & Figures, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sid/11186 (last updated Feb. 2014) [hereinafter Infographic: ICTY Facts & Figures].
83. Key Figures of the Cases, UNITED NATIONS INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/sid/24 (last updated Aug. 28, 2014) [hereinafter Key Figures
of the Cases].
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Infographic: ICTY Facts & Figures, supra note 82.
87. Id.
88. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA, AND SIERRA LEONE 41 (2006).
89. Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial Effects of the “Completion Strategies” on the Ad Hoc
International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 142-43 (2005) [hereinafter The Judicial
Effects of the “Completion Strategies”].
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instance by the end of 2008, and to complete all work by 2010.”90 A
year later, after the two Presidents of the tribunals “hinted that there
might be difficulties in fully respecting the dates set out in the completion strategy, the Security Council adopted another resolution,” Resolution 1534, to reaffirm the importance of the completion date.91
In adopting Resolution 1534, the Security Council established new
requirements for the leadership of the ICTY and the ICTR.92 First, ICTY
and ICTR prosecutors were required to review their caseloads “with a
view to determining which cases should be proceeded with and which
should be transferred to competent national jurisdictions.”93 Second, the
tribunals were to focus new indictments on “the most senior leaders
suspected of being most responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of
the relevant Tribunal.”94 Third, the Security Council required status reports on the progress of the tribunals’ implementation of the completion
strategies.95 While dates were set, some argued that these were merely
targets, not deadlines; there were too many variables, such as plea
agreements and the arrival of fugitives, to make hard predictions.96
Due to the completion strategy, the judges of the ICTY executed
two amendments to the ICTY’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence.97
First, Rule 11 bis was amended so that ICTY cases could be transferred
to competent domestic courts.98 Second, Rule 28 was amended to give
the ICTY judges a role in determining whether a potential indictee is
‘“senior’ enough to merit indictment by the ICTY.”99 In addition, in order to assist with the completion, the Security Council authorized the
appointment of ad litem judges.100 Security Council Resolution 1329,
which amended the Statute, reflected the actions the tribunals needed to
take in order to “expedite the conclusion of their work at the earliest
possible date.”101
90. S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003).
91. SCHABAS, supra note 88, at 43.
92. See id.
93. S.C. Res. 1534, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Larry D. Johnson, Closing an International Criminal Tribunal While Maintaining International Human Rights Standards and Excluding Impunity, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 158, 159-61
(2005).
97. The Judicial Effects of the “Completion Strategies,” supra note 89, at 146.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. SCHABAS, supra note 88, at 41.
101. Id.
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Some of the ICTY judges were very critical of the completion
strategy based on their concerns about the fair trial rights of defendants.102 The primary concern was whether the costliness and need of expediting a trial would take priority over the defendants’ right to a fair
trial.103 Some argued that this would be a fatal blow to the ICTY’s legacy.104 Nonetheless, it is evident that the ICTY’s completion strategy led
to “several procedural innovations and an increased use of documentary
evidence.”105
2. Residual Mechanisms for the ICTY
In December 2008, the UN Secretary General, per the Security
Council’s request, issued a report ‘“on the possible options’ available to
establish ad hoc mechanisms to carry out the residual mechanisms;” in
the report, the Secretary General identified the different functions that
the mechanisms should fulfil106 such as: trying fugitives, trying contempt cases, protecting witnesses, reviewing judgments, enforcing sentences, referring cases to national jurisdictions, assisting national jurisdictions, and hosting and maintaining archives.107 On December 22,
2010, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 1966, which established the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals
(IRMCT).108 The IRMCT is meant to be a “temporary and efficient”
mechanism that will continue the ICTY’s and the ICTR’s “jurisdiction,
rights and obligations and essential functions.”109 The IRMCT will
begin before the ICTR and the ICTY complete their outstanding judicial
work.110 “This ‘overlapping period’ is regulated by the Transitional Arrangements that are annexed to the Resolution.”111 The IRMCT has two
branches: one for the ICTY and one for the ICTR.112 The IRMCT
branch for the ICTY, located in The Hague, began its work on July 1,

102. CRYER, supra note 79, at 131.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Reiger, supra note 2, at 3.
107. Id.
108. About The Mechanism, supra note 20. The IRMCT is also sometimes referred to as the
Mechanism of International Criminal Tribunals (MICT). See, e.g., id.
109. About The Mechanism, supra note 20 (internal quotation omitted).
110. Denis, supra note 41, at 821.
111. Id. (citing S.C. Res. 1966, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1966 (Dec. 22, 2010)).
112. Id.
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2013.113
The IRMCT’s functions can be identified from reading the IRMCT
statute as a whole. Its functions correspond to those identified by the
tribunals as well as the functions presented in the U.N. Secretary General’s Report.114 The IRMCT handles appeals proceedings, retrials, trials
for contempt of the tribunal and false testimony, proceedings for review
of final judgment, sentence supervision and enforcement, assistance to
national jurisdictions, and preservation of the management of IRMCT,
ICTR, and ICTY archives.115 The IRMCT also serves an important function for accused individuals that are still at large.116 The IRMCT is
“competent to prosecute ‘the persons indicted by the ICTY or the ICTR
who are among the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for the crimes.’”117 This is essential because without a mechanism
to handle fugitive trials, one of the Security Council’s main purposes for
establishing the tribunals would be defeated.118
Both the ICTY and the ICTR have sections dedicated to victims
and witnesses.119 These sections are in charge of developing long-term
plans for witnesses afraid of retaliation, recommending to judges the
adoption of protection and security measures, and “providing physical
and psychological rehabilitation support services.”120 The IRMCT will
be tasked with continuing the witness protection programs.121
The ICTY “transferred the records and archives management function to the [Residual] Mechanism” on July 1, 2012.122 One year later, the
Mechanism was transferred particular judicial and prosecutorial functions such as supervising and enforcing the sentencing process, handling
“assistance requests from national authorities, and . . . protect[ing] . . .
victims and witnesses in closed cases and . . . cases where a witness is

113. About The Mechanism, supra note 20.
114. Denis, supra note 41, at 820 (citing S.C. Res. 258, U.N. Doc. S/RES/258 (May 21,
2009)).
115. About The Mechanism, supra note 20.
116. Denis, supra note 41, at 823.
117. Id.
118. Denis, supra note 41, at 822.
119. Oosthuizen, supra note 30, at 52.
120. Oosthuizen & Schaeffer, supra note 40, at 52.
121. About The Mechanism supra note 20.
122. President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Assessment and Report of Judge Theodor Meron in Accordance with Paragraph 6 of the Security Council Resolution
1534 (2004) and covering the period from May 24-Nov. 18, 2013, ¶ 55, U.N. Doc. S/2013/678
(Nov. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Assessment and Report of UN Security Council Resolution 1534].
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relevant” to the ICTY’s and the Mechanism’s judicial activities.”123 The
ICTY continues to provide administrative support services to the Mechanism.124
Establishing the IRMCT was essential to not only put the completion strategies of the two tribunals into motion, but also to begin preserving and building a legacy for both the ICTY and the ICTR.125 Both
Tribunals continue to help draft the Mechanism’s regulatory framework
for the provision of judicial services, which has helped eliminate the
need for a separate regulatory framework.126 The hope is that with the
IRMCT generating its successful record, “the meaning of ‘legacy’ of the
ad hoc tribunals may come full circle to be understood once again in its
initial two-fold sense: both as a message of how each tribunal will be
remembered, and as its residual functions connotation.”127
3. Legacy Considerations for the ICTY
While the ultimate goal is for the impact of a court’s work to continue after its conclusion, the ad hoc criminal tribunals’ legacy has not
always been positive.128 Tensions exist within the international community about the ad hoc courts’ “ability to focus on an area that is outside
their primary mandate and the pressure on the tribunals to maximize
time and efficiency.”129 “The ICTY was the “first special tribunal.”130
Located in The Hague, the ICTY’s distance from the affected populations was not given sufficient consideration in the tribunal’s early years,
“which allowed local actors to distort matters.”131 Eventually, the ICTY
tried to rectify the issue by establishing various outreach programs.132
Some argue that ICTY’s overall connotation remains negative.133
According to “[t]he only comprehensive country-by-country survey re123. Id. ¶ 56.
124. Id. ¶ 65.
125. About The Mechanism, supra note 20.
126. Assessment and Report of UN Security Council Resolution 1534, supra note 122, ¶ 57.
127. Pittman, supra note 37, at 817.
128. Sarkin, supra note 68, at 96; see Reiger, supra note 2, at 4.
129. Reiger, supra note 2, at 4.
130. International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/international-justice/international-criminal-tribunals-and-specialcourts/international-criminal-tribunal-for-yugoslavia.html (last visited March 16, 2014) [hereinafter GLOBAL POLICY FORUM].
131. CRYER, supra note 79, at 135.
132. Id.
133. Kristin Xueqin Wu, Experiences that Count: A Comparative Study of the ICTY and
SCSL in Shaping the Image of Justice, 9 UTRECHT L. REV. 60, 62 (2013)(Neth.).
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garding the attitudes towards the ICTY carried out in 2002 by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA),” the
greater the number of accused that came from an ethnic community, the
more negatively the ICTY was viewed in those regions.134 The ICTY
has also come under scrutiny for being “politicized, biased, unfair, and
very costly. . . . critics question[ed] the tribunal’s ability to ease tensions
and promote reconciliation” in the regions.135
There is also a perception that the ICTY’s impact was ultimately
legal and judicial.136 One proponent of this view is Professor Ljubo
Bavcon, who noted that:
Although in many respects the ICTY undoubtedly represented
an important step forward in the development of international
law, the idea that it could create peace and security in the region was utopian and unrealistic. So there is no doubt that the
creation of the tribunal did more for international justice and
international criminal law generally than for the formerYugoslavia.137
Opponents to this view contend that the ICTY’s true legacy runs
much deeper. According to Petar Finci, Senior Information Assistant for
the ICTY, although the Tribunal is conscious of its negative image:
[T]here is not too much we can do to change minds and
hearts. . . . Historical experience from the Nuremberg trials
shows that only the second generation, who are untouched by
the violence, can start to face these trials objectively. However,
that day will come; we have hope for the future generation, and
much of our work now focuses on leaving a legacy for the future generation. Obviously there are mistakes: we have no
precedence to follow, and most of the time we are inventing
“rulebooks” ourselves. However, we believe that the work of
this Tribunal is best accessed in the future. We play for the
long run.138
The major hurdle and damage to the ICTY’s legacy can partially
be traced to the lack of planning and lack of focus on early and comprehensive outreach. The ICTY’s outreach program was not established

134. Id. at 62 n.6.
135. GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, supra note 130.
136. Frédéric Mégret, The Legacy of the ICTY as Seen Through Some of its Actors and Observers, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 1011, 1047 (2011).
137. Id.
138. Wu, supra note 133, at 62.
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until six years after the Tribunal was established.139 As the former president of the ICTY, Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, explained, “there
was a need—a necessity, really—for the Tribunal to do more: to actually communicate with the people of the former Yugoslavia living hundreds of miles away from the Tribunal that had been established for
their benefit.”140
During the beginning of the ICTY’s outreach program, the Tribunal took a passive approach by simply providing information about the
trial at its field offices rather than actively distributing the information.141 The outreach program also tended to focus its efforts on “legal scholars and local elites” instead of reaching out to the general population.142 As a result, some perceive the ICTY’s outreach as insufficient
to have an actual impact.143 The ICTY’s outreach even acknowledged
that its events “confirmed the need for further ICTY engagement on the
community level to disseminate the information on the established facts
as part of the legacy effort.”144
Recently, the ICTY has been working with local authorities and international partners to establish information centers in the former Yugoslavia.145 Since 2010, the outreach program has increased its efforts.146
‘The ICTY has also created a partnership with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) field operations in Belgrade, Podgorica, Pristina, Sarajevo, Skopje, and Zagre to facilitate activities to support the Tribunal’s legacy, such as training lawyers and
judges in the former Yugoslavia.147 While the project’s focus is to transfer “knowledge and materials from the ICTY to legal professionals in
national jurisdictions,” it has also undertaken the task of “transcribing
ICTY proceedings into local languages,” which is very important in educating the public at large.148
Ultimately, the ICTY’s full accounting of all 161 indicted individ139. Id. at 63.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 70.
143. Id. at 63-64.
144. ICTY Outreach Activities 2007, ICTY, http://icty.org/sid/10128 (last visited Dec. 25,
2013).
145. Assessment and Report of UN Security Council Resolution 1534, supra note 122, ¶ 69.
146. Wu, supra note 133, at 64.
147. Assessment and Report of UN Security Council Resolution 1534, supra note 122, ¶ 68;
Sarkin, supra note 68, at 96.
148. Sarkin, supra note 68, at 96.
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uals significantly symbolizes the success of international justice efforts.149 It sets an example for other tribunals by indicting individuals
from all sides of the conflict.150 Moreover, as stated by ICTY Judge
G.K. McDonald:
The judgments of the Tribunals do more than determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused. They do more than establish
a historical record of what transpired. They do more than interpret international humanitarian law. Rather, the judgments of
the Tribunals are evidence of actual enforcement of international norms. This is the best proof that the numerous conventions, protocols, and resolutions affirming human dignity are
more than promises. Rather, the rule of law is an important
component of the peace process.151
Before the ICTY was established, international criminal law was
rarely used.152 “Despite its shortfalls, the tribunal . . . [was] instrumental
in the creation of the first permanent international criminal court.”153
Importantly, for the purposes of legacy planning, the fact that both the
ICTY and the ICTR are physically located at a large distance from the
affected communities foreshadows some of the issues the ICC may need
to address.
B. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
1. ICTR’s Historical Background and Completion Strategy
The factors that gave rise to the Rwandan Genocide have roots going back to the colonization of Rwanda.154 Ethnic tensions erupted between Hutus, who were the majority of the population, and Tutsis, who
had previously been favored by the colonizers.155 In April 1994, the day
after extremists allegedly shot down the plane carrying the presidents of
Rwanda and Burundi, violence in Rwanda erupted.156 The Rwandan
Armed Forces (FAR) and armed government-trained civilian militias set
149. Id. ¶ 72.
150. Sadat, supra note 42, at 14.
151. Agnieszka Szpak, Legacy of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals in Implementing International Humanitarian Law, 4 MEDITERRANEAN J. SOC. SCI. 529 (2013).
152. Sarkin, supra note 68, at 86.
153. GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, supra note 130.
154. Rwanda:
A
Historical
Chronology,
PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rwanda/etc/cron.html (last visited July 21, 2014).
155. Id.
156. Id.

GOZANI_FINAL_FOR_PUB

2015]

4/4/2015 12:55 PM

Beginning to Learn How to End

351

up roadblocks and makeshift security checkpoints where they massacred Tutsis and moderate Hutus.157 Encouraged by mass media, ordinary
civilians “hunted down and killed their neighbors and friends.”158 Despite the ongoing violence, U.N. forces stood by as the slaughter continued and were forbidden to intervene because it would breach their
“monitoring” mandate.159 On April 8, 1994, the Rwandese Patriotic
Front (RPF), a Tutsi-dominated organization, launched a major offensive to end the genocide and “rescue 600 of its troops surrounded in Kigali.”160 However, several months later, conflicting accounts from U.N.
agencies reported that RPF troops carried out “a series of reprisal killings,” executing several hundred civilians.161 “Over the course of one
hundred days, more than eight hundred thousand ethnic Tutsis, Twas, or
moderate Hutus were the victims of genocide in Rwanda.”162
In 1994, the U.N. Security Council created the ICTR in 1994163 and
decided to locate the seat of the ICTR in Arusha, United Republic of
Tanzania, a neighboring country, because of security concerns.164 The
ICTR was designed to contribute to “the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace” by ensuring redress for the most serious violations.165 It had jurisdiction over war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.166 While the ICTR was
given an initial four-year mandate, the U.N. did not set a deadline for
the court to finish its work.167 It was, however, understood that as an ad
hoc international tribunal with a mandate limited to grave crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994, the ICTR’s lifespan would be relatively
157. Timothy Gallimore, The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) and its Contributions to Reconciliation in Rwanda, 14 NEW ENG. J. OF INT’L & COMP. L.
239,
240-41
(2008);
Rwanda:
A
Historical
Chronology,
PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/rwanda/etc/cron.html (last visited July 21, 2014).
158. Id. at 241.
159. Rwanda: A Historical Chronology, supra note 154.
160. Id.
161. Rwanda Assessment: Country Information and Policy Unit, REFWORLD (Apr. 2002),
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/486a53400.pdf.
162. Symposium on the Legacy of International Criminal Courts and Tribunals in Africa
with a Focus on the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda, INT’L
CTR.
FOR
ETHICS,
JUSTICE,
AND
PUB.
LIFE
1,
1
(Feb.
2010),
http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/internationaljustice/Legacy_of_ICTR_in_Africa_ICEJPL.pd
f.
163. Id.
164. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/808 (Nov. 8, 1994).
165. Closing the International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals, supra note 39, at 4 n.14.
166. CRYER, supra note 79, at 136.
167. Aptel, supra note 78, at 169–70.
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short.168
As time passed, the ICTR’s budget increased while the attitudes
and priorities of U.N. member-states shifted; the international community voiced frustration with the tribunal’s efficiency and ability to successfully achieve its mandate.169 This frustration led to increased pressure on ICTR officials to complete the tribunal’s work.170 Similar to the
ICTY, the ICTR was also slow to begin its outreach work; in 2000, an
“info point” was opened in Kigali where information about the trials as
well as court proceedings broadcasts were made publicly available, the
ICTR also developed a Kinyarwanda section in its website which translated key decisions into Kinyarwanda.171
The ICTR is currently wrapping up its work and does not have any
cases in progress.172 It has completed a total of seventy-five cases, which
include eleven pending appeals and twelve acquittals; it also transferred
ten cases to two national jurisdictions, France and Rwanda.173 So far,
seven individuals have been released after completing their sentences,
two detainees died before judgment, and nine accused individuals are
still at large.174 Recently, the ICTR announced that all but one of its appeals would be concluded in 2013 and 2014.175
Regarding its completion strategy, the ICTR moved slower than
the ICTY.176 After the ICTY announced its completion strategy, the
U.N. urged the ICTR to formulate a completion strategy and a plan to
transfer cases to competent national courts.177 The ICTR presented the
first draft of its completion strategy to the U.N. in July 2003.178 Similar
168. Id. at 170.
169. Aptel, supra note 78, at 170.
170. Id.
171. COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 65 (Nicholas Waddell
& Phil Clark eds., 2008).
CRIM.
TRIBUNAL
FOR
RWANDA,
172. Status
of
Cases,
INT’L
http://www.unictr.org/Cases/StatusofCases/tabid/204/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2013).
173. Id.
174. Status of Cases, supra note 172, at 1.
175. President of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, Letter dated Nov. 13, 2013
from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda addressed to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2013/663 (Nov. 13, 2013).
176. SCHABAS, supra note 88, at 42.
177. The Judicial Effects of the “Completion Strategies,” supra note 89, at 144.
178. Eighth Annual Report of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31
December 1994, Annex ¶ 2, 2003, U.N. Doc. A/58/140-S/2003/707 (July 11, 2003) [hereinafter
Eighth Annual ICTR Report].
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to ICTY, Security Council Resolution 1503 provided the same timetable
for the ICTR’s completion.179 The completion strategy was later expanded by Security Council Resolution 1534 for the ICTY and the
ICTR in order to review its’ caseloads and decide which cases could be
tried by domestic courts.180 Rwanda, France, the Netherlands, and Norway had all agreed to accept cases.181 In particular, there was initial reticence in the idea of transferring cases to Rwanda due to doubts on the
condition of the Rwandan prisons and whether the court could provide
fair trials.182 Despite operating at a slow pace due to delays, in part due
to the large number of people awaiting trial, cases were transferred
nonetheless.183
According to the completion strategy report for the ICTR, presently, the “Tribunal has completed all work at the trial level . . . disposed of
all referral applications, and has successfully concluded all evidence
preservation hearings.”184 To date, all that remain are appeals cases.185
Most of the ICTR’s judicial functions have already been transferred to
the Residual Mechanism, with the first Residual Mechanism appeal under way.186 In addition, “the transition of administrative services is ongoing and . . . expected to be complete by the end of 2014.”187 The ICTR
has also begun the transfer of the Tribunal’s records and archives to the
Residual Mechanism.188
2. Residual Mechanisms for the ICTR
As previously mentioned, on December 22, 2010, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 1966, which established the International
Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT).189 According to
the IRMCT’s First Annual Report, “[i]n establishing the Mechanism,
179. CRYER, supra note 79, at 139.
180. Id.
181. Aptel, supra note 78, at 177-78.
182. See id. at 139–40.
AND
RESPONSIBILITY,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH,
183. JUSTICE
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-05.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
184. Report on the Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(as of Nov. 5, 2013), ¶ 76, U.N. Doc., S/2013/663 (Nov. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Report on the
Completion Strategy of the ICTR].
185. Id.
186. Id. ¶¶ 6, 76.
187. The Registrar Meets the Senegalese President, ICTR NEWSLETTER (Oct.-Dec. 2013),
http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English%5CNews%5CNewsletter%5COct-Dec2013.pdf.
188. Report on the Completion Strategy of the ICTR, supra note 184, at ¶ 76.
189. The IRMCT is also sometime referred to as the Mechanism of International Criminal
Tribunals (MICT). About The Mechanism, supra note 21.
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the Security Council emphasized that it should be “a small, temporary
and efficient structure whose functions and size would diminish over
time.”190 The residual mechanism for the ICTR is located in Arusha,
Tanzania and began functioning on July 1, 2012.191 Pursuant to Resolution 1966, the IRMCT will have jurisdiction over three of the nine individuals indicted by the ICTR for their participation in the genocide who
are still at large.192 The other six “have been referred to Rwanda,” but
the IRMCT will continue to “assist with tracking efforts” for those cases.193
The Mechanism has been mandated for a period of four years with
subsequent periods of two years following progress reviews.194 The
Arusha branch is currently operating out of the same locations as the
ICTR, but is expected to move to its new premises in 2016. The Government of Tanzania has provided the land and connection to facilities
at no cost.195 Beyond the Mechanism’s technical tasks devoted to the archives, relocating acquitted persons, monitoring proceedings in Rwanda, and trying of fugitives, it will be critical for the Mechanism to facilitate “development assistance and promote capacity building and
educational programs to ensure that the legacy of accountability and
peace takes hold.”196
According to its first annual report, the Mechanism has continued
to provide the same level of witness support and protection services
while streamlining the process.197 The unit “handled protection issues
not only in Rwanda but also in the Great Lakes region, from urban centers to refugee camps.”198 This has included taking surveys among the
witnesses to try to improve its efficiency and to ensure that witnesses
are receiving the services.199 “In addition, it has “developed strategies
that are currently being implemented to further strengthen the management and safekeeping of confidential witness information.”200
190. First Annual Report of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, ¶
7, U.N. Doc. A/68/219-S/2013/464 (Aug. 2, 2013) [hereinafter First Annual Report of the International Mechanism].
191. About The Mechanism, supra note 21.
192. Report on the Completion Strategy of the ICTR, supra note 184, ¶ 5.
193. Id.
194. First Annual Report of the International Mechanism, supra note 190, ¶ 7.
195. Id. ¶ 27.
196. Sadat, supra note 42, at 14.
197. First Annual Report of the International Mechanism, supra note 190, ¶ 61.
198. Id. ¶ 62.
199. Id. ¶ 61.
200. Id.
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In October 2012, the IRMCT issued its first appeal decision that
upheld a decision of the ICTR to transfer the case of Phénéas Munyargarma to Rwanda.201 In reaching its decision, the Appeals Chamber stated that the IRMCT’s Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence reflect normative continuity with those of the ICTY and ICTR. According
to the Appeals Chamber, “these parallels are not simply a matter of
convenience or efficiency but serve to uphold principles of due process
and fundamental fairness, which are the cornerstones of international
justice.”202
3. Legacy Considerations for the ICTR
The ICTR’s mandate was to render justice and contribute to reconciliation.203 From the beginning, there was concern that this mandate
was broad, and some had argued that it was based on a false premise
that criminal trials could contribute to the reconciliation of society.204
There were also concerns that the ICTR was both “geographically and
metaphorically too distant from the people of Rwanda, who remain for
the most part uniformed about unaffected by the Tribunal.”205
Since the ICTR was limited by a temporal jurisdiction restricted to
crimes committed in 1994, the acts of planning the crimes were excluded from prosecution.206 Additionally, the prosecution’s policy to focus
on the highest-level perpetrators was difficult for victims to accept.207
The prosecution was also criticized for being biased due to the lack of
public indictments of the RPF for alleged crimes, which “may fuel a
sense of impunity among members of the current government and lead
to continued instability in the region, as well as contribute to a feeling
of persecution among Hutus.”208
All these facts have potentially undermined the legacy of the
ICTR. There have been arguments that the ICTR’s primary contribution
has been in the area of international jurisprudence at the expense of de201. Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (MICT) Issues First Appeal Decision
Upholding a Decision of the ICTR to transfer the Case Phénéas Munyargarma to Rwanda,
UNITED NATIONS MECHANISM FOR INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNALS (Oct. 5, 2012),
http://www.unmict.org/en/news/mechanism-international-criminal-tribunals-mict-issues-firstappeal-decision-upholding-decision [hereinafter MICT Issues First Appeal Decision].
202. Id.
203. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Nov, 8, 1994).
204. Aptel, supra note 78, at 185.
205. CRYER, supra note 79, at 122.
206. Aptel, supra note 78, at 186-87.
207. Id. at 187.
208. Sadat, supra note 42, at 16.
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livering justice to the genocide survivors in Rwanda.209 Unfortunately,
there has yet to be a comprehensive survey of the Rwandan general
population to gauge the impact and contributions of the ICTR.210 Nevertheless, the ICTR was able to contribute to reconciliation in several
ways. First, a factual account of the genocide was created; second, judicial notice confirming the genocide against the Tutsi ethnic group in
Rwanda was issued; third, individual criminal responsibility rather than
group criminalization or stigmatization was established; fourth, almost
the entire interim government of the Rwanda genocide era was placed
on trial at the Tribunal; fifth, victims were given a voice to validate their
experience and suffering; and finally, re-education and communication
promoting respect for human rights and the rule of law in Rwanda was
provided.211
Additionally, on October 2, 1998, the ICTR established the first
ever conviction of the crime of genocide in an international criminal
court when it handed down its judgment of Jean-Paul Akayesu, the former Mayor of Taba commune.212 This determination, resulting from a
fair and independent judicial process, was essential to establishing a
clear historical record, assisting with reconciliation, and continuing the
fight against impunity.
C. The Special Court for Sierra Leone
1. SCSL’s Historical Background and Completion Strategy
Since 1991, Sierra Leone suffered a decade long conflict marked
by systemic and widespread violations of human rights and humanitarian law. The rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), entered
Sierra Leone from neighboring Liberia with the goal of overthrowing
the government and in its process, committed a multitude of atrocities
that included recruiting child soldiers, amputating its victims’ limbs,
torture, the mass raping of women and girls, and also the killing of several thousand civilians.213 In 2002, a treaty between the U.N. and the
209. Gallimore, supra note 156, at 243.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 251.
212. Gallimore, supra note 156, at 241.
213. See generally Summary, in Sierra Leone: Sowing Terror, Atrocities against Civilians in
Sierra Leone, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Vol. 10, No. 3 (A) (July 1998),
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/sierra/ [hereinafter Sowing Terror]; see also, OPEN JUSTICE
SOCIETY INITIATIVE, Legacy: Completing the Work of the Special Court of Sierra Leone 2 (2011)
[hereinafter Legacy: Completing the Work of the Special Court of Sierra Leone].
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Government of Sierra Leone established the SCSL.214 The treaty granted
the SCSL:
[t]he power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law
and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra
Leone since 30 November 1996, including those leaders who,
in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment
of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.215
In addition to the SCSL’s purpose to bring those who had previously committed atrocities to justice, it also had “forward looking aims”
such as “ending impunity, deterring would-be perpetrators, providing a
measure of justice for the victims, helping to strengthen the rule of law
in Sierra Leone, and contributing to capacity-building within the country, particularly for the legal profession.”216
The SCSL was the first of its kind in several ways. It was the first
of the “hybrid” ad hoc criminal tribunals, meaning it involved both international and national law components.217 The U.N. Secretary General
appointed international judges, which formed a majority, and the Government of Sierra Leone appointed the rest of the judges.218 The SCSL
applied its own Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, but those
made reference to international instruments and some national laws.219
The SCSL was also the first court to operate in the country where

214. Vincent O. Nmehielle & Charles Chernor Jalloh, The Legacy of the Special Court for
Sierra Leone, in FLETCHER FOREIGN WORLD AFF. 107, 107 (Summer 2006).
215. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 1 (Jan. 16, 2002), available
at http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3D&%E2%80%BA [hereinafter Statute of the Court for Sierra Leone]; Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1(1) (Jan.
16,
2002),
available
at
http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CLk1rMQtCHg%3d&tabid=176 [hereinafter Agreement between the U.N. and the Government of Sierra Leone].
216. Alison Smith, The Intersection of Law, Policy, and Practice, in INTERNATIONALIZED
CRIMINAL COURTS, SIERRA LEONE, EAST TIMOR, KOSOVO, AND CAMBODIA, 125, 125 (Cesare
Romano, André Nollkaemper, & Jann K. Kleffner eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2004). [hereinafter
The Intersection of Law, Policy, and Practice].
217. Id. at 134; see also No Peace Without Justice, Making Justice Count Assessing the impact and legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Sierra Leone and Liberia, 1, 1 (Sept.
2012) http://www.npwj.org/content/Making-Justice-Count-Assessing-impact-and-legacy-SpecialCourt-Sierra-Leone-Sierra-Leone-and [hereinafter Impact and Legacy Survey].
218. CRYER, supra note 79, at 182.
219. Aldo Zammit Borda, Precedent in International Courts and Tribunals, 2 CAMBRIDGE J.
OF INT. & COMP. L. 287, 297 (2013).
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the crimes were committed and the first international court to view legacy and outreach as priorities since the early stages of its work.220 All of
the SCSL trials were held in Sierra Leone with the exception of the
Charles Taylor trial, which had to be transferred to The Hague due to
security concerns.221 The SCSL’s outreach program focused on “improving domestic understanding of the court’s activities.”222 The hope
was that the SCSL could “advance[] the state of international criminal
justice while strengthening the country’s domestic legal system” so that
the citizens of Sierra Leona could believe in the process.223
The establishment of SCSL was a landmark achievement in international criminal justice. The SCSL “has helped to establish an authoritative record of the nature of the crimes that took place during the Civil
War - who was responsible for them, what groups were targeted, and
why.”224 In addition to its own success, it provides valuable lessons for
future courts and the advancement of international criminal justice. The
SCSL is the first ad hoc, post-Cold War, international tribunal to close225
and is unique in that it contemplated issues of completion and legacy
much earlier than the other tribunals. Despite its efforts, those issues did
not receive the attention they deserved from the SCSL’s political backers, which left the SCSL to devise its own solutions.226
In order to manage the responsibility of witness protection, the
SCSL undertook steps to create the first national protection program,
one of only a few witness protection programs in Africa.227 The Witness
Protection Unit provides “protection and assistance to witnesses in national cases, such as organized crime, gender based violence and corrup220.

See generally THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, THE RESIDUAL SPECIAL COURT
http://www.rscsl.org (last visited on Jan. 25, 2015).
221. Id.
222. Suma, supra note 28, at 1.
223. Id.
224. ICTJ, SCSL Holds Valuable Lessons for International Justice, EXPLORING THE LEGACY
OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, (Nov. 04, 2012),
http://scsl-legacy.ictj.org/ictj-scsl-holds-valuable-lessons-international-justice; see also Ninth
Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Special Court of Sierra Leone,
1,
37
(June
2011
May
2012),
available
at
http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ZEDnSBp6ahc%3d&tabid=176; [hereinafter Ninth Annual Report of the President].
225. Impact and Legacy Survey, supra note 217, at 36.
226. Thierry Cruvellier, From the Taylor Trial to a Lasting Legacy: Putting the Special
Court Model to the Test, International Center for Transitional Justice and Sierra Leone Court
Monitoring Programme, 1, 3 (2009), http://ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-SierraLeone-TaylorTrial-2009-English.pdf.
227. Ninth Annual Report of the President, supra note 224, at 38.
FOR SIERRA LEONE,
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tion cases.”228
By the end of 2012, the SCSL had indicted thirteen people and
convicted nine, “including the first sitting African head of state, [former
Liberian President] Charles Taylor.”229 In September 2013, the Appeals
Chambers judges of the Special Court upheld Taylor’s conviction by the
Trial Chamber in April 2012, concluding the SCSL’s final case.230 Later,
in December 2013, as part its successful completion of its mandate, the
SCSL formally handed over the SCSL’s landmark courthouse to the
Government of Sierra Leone.231
2. Residual Mechanisms for the SCSL
There were serious risks involved in closing the SCSL, just as
there are risks with closing the other tribunals; however, the residual
mechanisms that are supported and moulded by the local population and
civil society can help ensure that the SCSL’s closure leaves a lasting
legacy in Sierra Leone.232 In contrast to other international criminal tribunals’ residual mechanisms, the Residual Special Court of Sierra Leone (RSCSL) began its work after the SCSL shut down instead of during
its last phases.233 RSCSL was set up by an agreement between the U.N.
and the government of Sierra Leone in August 2010 to address the residual issues resulting from the closing of the Special Court. The Sierra
Leone Parliament ratified the agreement in December 2011.234 According to the RSCSL Statute:
The purpose of the Residual Special Court is to carry out the
functions of the Special Court for Sierra Leone that must continue after the closure of the Special Court. To that end, the
Residual Special Court shall: maintain, preserve and manage
its archives, including the archives of the Special Court; provide for witness and victim protection and support; respond to
228. Id. at 36.
229. About this Project, EXPLORING THE LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA
LEONE, http://scsl-legacy.ictj.org/about-project (last visited Sept. 16, 2014).
230. Alpha Sesay, Charles Taylor’s Conviction and Sentence Upheld: What next for him?,
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE MONITOR, A PROJECT OF THE OPEN SOCIETY JUSTICE INITIATIVE
(Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.ijmonitor.org/2013/09/charles-taylors-conviction-and-sentenceupheld-what-next-for-him/.
231. Special Court Press Release, supra note 16.
232. See generally Cruvellier, supra note 226.
233. Geraldine Coughlan, Much remains to be done in Sierra Leone, INT’L JUSTICE TRIBUNE
(May 9, 2012), http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/much-remains-be-done-sierraleone.
234. Ninth Annual Report of the President, supra note 224, at 38.

GOZANI_FINAL_FOR_PUB

360

4/4/2015 12:55 PM

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 36:331

requests for access to evidence by national prosecution authorities; supervise enforcement of sentences; review convictions
and acquittals; conduct contempt of court proceedings; provide
defense counsel and legal aid for the conduct of proceedings
before the Residual Special Court; respond to requests from
national authorities with respect to claims for compensation;
and prevent double jeopardy.235
The RSCSL seat will be seated in Sierra Leone.236 The fact that the
SCSL is located in the country where its subject crimes were committed
is advantageous in facilitating its residual mechanisms in several
ways.237 First, it provides increased accessibility to witnesses and victims;238 and second, it allows increased visibility of the court’s work.239
Such a presence creates the possibility that the SCSL’s work “may assist in rebuilding the Sierra Leonean justice system and serve as a symbol against impunity for egregious crimes in the region as a whole;”240
third, it increases affected communities’ access to the court and its archives.241
The RSCSL has the authority to preside over ad hoc judicial proceedings, such as review proceedings or contempt of court cases arising
out of witness tampering.242 “It is anticipated that of the 557 witnesses
who testified [in SCSL proceedings], approximately 100 may require
ongoing post-trial witness protection or support.243 According to the
Ninth Annual Report of the President of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, “[t]he RSCSL staff will work closely with the Sierra Leone Police, in particular the Witness Protection Unit, to ensure that the concerns and needs of witnesses are adequately addressed.”244
The RSCSL also has jurisdiction to try the case against the SCSL’s
last remaining fugitive, Johnny Paul Koroma but has the option of refer235. Id.
236. Id. at 35 (citing Article 6 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government
of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone).
237. Oosthuizen & Schaeffer, supra note 40, at 65.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Valerie Oosterveld, The International Criminal Court and the Closure of the TimeLimited International and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals, 8 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 13, 27 (2010)
[hereinafter The International Criminal Court and the Closure of the Time-Limited International
and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals].
242. Ninth Annual Report of the President, supra note 224, at 38.
243. Id.
244. Id.
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ring the case to a competent national authority.245 Upon the closure of
the SCSL, the SCSL’s archives became the property of the RSCSL and
are co-located in both Sierra Leone and in the Netherlands, where the
RSCSL interim seat is located.246 Pursuant to the RSCSL Agreement,
“in order to preserve and promote the legacy of the Special Court, electronic access to, and printed copies of, the public archives shall be
available to the public in Sierra Leone.”247 These archives, which will be
made available to the public through the Sierra Leone Peace Museum,
are “one of the richest resources on the nation’s conflict.” 248 The Peace
Museum will be an independent national institution dedicated to the
memory of Sierra Leone’s decade-long conflict249 and will include a
memorial, exhibition, and an archive that will “provide information to
future generations about the conflict’s history and respect the memory
of those who suffered during the conflict.”250
3. Legacy of the SCSL
The international community had high expectations for the SCSL,
expecting this new model of ad hoc tribunal to conduct its business
more efficiently and economically.251 The new model was designed with
an “in-country presence, the incorporation of national and international
staff, a reasonably secure environment, and good state cooperation.”252
According to Geoffrey Robertson, the first president of the Appeals
Chamber of the SCSL, “the Court alone ha[d] the power to deliver the
justice that is a prerequisite for reconciliation.”253
The SCSL was, however, not without criticism. Some argued that
the length and the delaying of trials, the 150 million dollar price tag, and
the court’s limited jurisdiction to only focus on crime starting on November 30, 1996, all posed as a threat to peace in Sierra Leone. First,
the delayed initiation of trials was problematic because some of the
most important indictees and actors involved in the conflict either died
245. Id. at 39.
246. Id. at 38.
247. Id. at 36 (citing Article 7.2 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government
of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Residual Special Court for Sierra Leone).
248. Id. at 36.
249. Id. at 37.
250. Id. at 5.
251. Cruvellier, supra note 226, at 19.
252. Id. at 44.
253. Ozonnia Ojielo, Beyond TRC: Governance in Sierra Leone, in RESCUING A FRAGILE
STATE: SIERRA LEONE 2002-2008 43, 50 (Lansana Gberie ed., 2009).
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or were still unaccounted for by the time the trials began in 2002.254
Second, the SCSL’s limited jurisdiction has led some to perceive the
court as Freetown-centric because Freetown and the Western area of Sierra Leone only began feeling the war’s impact after 1996.255 Finally,
some believed that the SCSL criminal prosecutions were a threat to
peace “and a Western intrusion in African accountability Mechanisms.”256
Nevertheless, positives of the SCSL generally outweigh the criticisms. The SCSL was able to create a working relationship with the
State, which was essential to its operation since the SCSL did not have a
police force of its own to apprehend suspects.257 The SCSL also employed local judges, lawyers, and investigators who are able to use their
training to serve Sierra Leone even after the SCSL’s closure.258 The
SCSL also made great contributions to the jurisprudence of international
law on the recruitment and use of child soldiers in armed hostilities, the
criminalisation of forced marriage as a crime against humanity, and attacks on peacekeepers.259 The SCSL established legal precedent that the
reasons for fighting are immaterial in determining where crimes against
humanity have been committed; by trying senior officials from all three
war parties, the SCSL sent the public a message that such crimes would
not be tolerated regardless of one’s goals or intentions.260
According to Alison Smith, who previously served as the Chief
Legal Advisor to the SCSL’s Vice President and is currently the Director of No Peace Without Justice’s International Criminal Justice Pro254. Danielle Koehn, An Imperfect Body, 1 UNDERGRADUATE TRANSITIONAL JUST. REV.
173, 179 (2013).
255. Id. at 184.
256. Id. at 186. (quoting William Schabas, A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone
Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court of Sierra Leone, in TRUTH
COMMISSIONS AND COURTS: THE TENSION BETWEEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE SEARCH FOR
TRUTH, 3, 26 (William Schabas & Shane Darcy eds., 2004).
257. Mariana O. Rosenblut, The International Criminal Court on Trial, MAXIMUM AFR. J.
(Nov. 17, 2013), http://maximumafrica.org/east-africa/international-criminal-court-trial/; see also
Patricia M. Wald, Apprehending War Criminals: Does International Cooperation Work?, 27 AM.
U. INT’L REV. 229, 230 (2012).
258. David Tolbert, ICTJ: SCSL Holds Valuable Lessons for International Justice,
EXPLORING THE LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT OF SIERRA LEONE (Nov. 4, 2012), http://scsllegacy.ictj.org/ictj-scsl-holds-valuable-lessons-international-justice.
259. Rosemary Grey, The Hague 2012, in On Mandates, INT’L PEACE AND SECURITY
INSTITUTE (June 13, 2014), http://ipsinstitute.org/on-mandates/.
260. CRYER, supra note 79, at 184. The SCSL tried members from the Civil Defense Force
(a defense force set up by the Sierra Leone Government), the RUF, and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); Suma, supra note 28, at 1.
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gram, the main thing that the SCSL should be remembered for is its vision to be an institution established to serve the people of Sierra Leone
and of Liberia.261 This vision began, according to Smith, when the U.N.
Security Council agreed with the government of Sierra Leone to place
the SCSL in Sierra Leone.262 Smith asserts that this vision continued on
through the entire existence of the SCSL and that other tribunals should
refer to it when carrying out their own mandates.263
As stated previously, the SCSL was the first international court to
view legacy and outreach as priorities from the early stages of its work
despite “legacy” never being an explicit part of the SCSL’s mandate.264
Its outreach program educates communities in both Sierra Leone and
Liberia on the “trials, impunity, and the rule of law” with the goal of
stimulating informed discussion.265 Since the Special Court’s establishment, the SCSL’s Outreach and Public Affairs Section has sought to
“provide the greatest possible accessibility” to the SCSL’s activities.266
The staff, based in Freetown, work with eight Field Officers located in
the Provinces of Sierra Leone, two staff members in Liberia, and a network of civil society organizations to help inform the local community
about the SCSL’s trial progress.267
By prioritizing outreach in the early stages of its work, the SCSL
established a solid basis for its legacy. The SCSL designated an outreach coordinator for each region and school children would learn about
the history of the conflict and the work that the SCSL was doing every
Tuesday and Wednesday.268 The Court also used a variety of outreach
techniques such as utilizing local media, cooperating with NGOs, working with local organization, and setting up booths at local markets.269
The SCSL’s outreach program raised awareness about the trials
and the investigations.270 It also engaged local communities and civil so261. ICTJ’s SCSL Legacy Podcast Series: Alison Smith Discusses the Legacy and Impact of
the Special Court in Sierra Leone, EXPLORING THE LEGACY OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA
LEONE (Jan. 23, 2013), http://scsl-legacy.ictj.org/ictjs-scsl-legacy-podcast-series-alison-smith
[hereinafter ICTJ’s SCSL Legacy Podcast Series: Alison Smith].
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Impact and Legacy Survey, supra note 217, at 1.
265. Ninth Annual Report of the President, supra note 224, at 32.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Ojielo, supra note 253.
269. Koehn, supra note 254, at 188.
270. WAR DON DON (New Day Films 2010) (see 13:30 for an example of the Special
Court’s outreach efforts).
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ciety.271 From the beginning stages of the SCSL operations, there was a
clear priority for “court officials to raise awareness, explain, and get
support for their work.”272 Due to the relatively low literacy rates in Sierra Leone and Liberia, the SCSL made use of video and audio reports
as a means of disseminating information.273 Indeed, many individuals
have said that the SCSL’s innovative outreach program will serve as a
model for future tribunals.274
The outreach staff also collaborated with civil society groups to
create a nationwide campaign on the problem of community violence
and held discussions with youth groups and organizations.275 Other
mechanisms the outreach staff utilized include: radio discussions and
call-in programs; “Accountability Now Clubs” for university students in
Sierra Leone and Liberia; schools visits; year-round trial screening
summaries; and Special Court interactive forums where approximately
forty non-governmental organizations meet once a month to discuss the
court’s latest activities and ask for feedback.276 The SCSL has also made
“use of traditional methods of information dissemination such as town
hall meetings in villages and towns.”277 In addition, the buildings and
grounds were used for the trials and will be used in a way to honor the
victims and help the process of national healing.278 A survey conducted
by the nongovernmental organization (NGO) No Peace Without Justice
and the SCSL indicated that there was a high degree of awareness of the
SCSL’s activities in both Sierra Leone and Liberia.279 More than 90% of
overall respondents had heard of the SCSL and nearly 50% of people
have participated in outreach activities.280
One unique challenge the SCSL faced was the Charles Taylor trial.
Pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 1688 (2006), the trial of
Charles Taylor, the former president of Liberia, was held in the Special
Court’s Hague sub-office.281 The SCSL moved the Charles Taylor trial

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

Ninth Annual Report of the President, supra note 224, at 32.
Cruvellier, supra note 226, at 28.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 29.
Ninth Annual Report of the President, supra note 224, at 34.
Id.
Id.
Tolbert, supra note 258.
Impact and Legacy Survey, supra note 217, at 1.
Id.
S.C. Res. 1688, at 1, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1688 (June 16, 2006).
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due to security concerns in the area.282 The transfer of the Taylor trial
had a symbolic impact; before the transfer, the court “previously garnered praise for sitting in the country where the crimes” occurred and
giving the “nationals a significant, if not equal, role in the process.”283
The Special Court took several measures to try and recreate the
success that it had with holding the cases in Sierra Leone. For judgment
in the Charles Taylor trial, the “feed was broadcast[ed] in Krio, with a
Krio interpreter supplied by the Court Management Section,” this made
the Charles Taylor judgment accessible to people who were not fluent in
English.284 In the capital of Liberia, Monrovia, “several radio stations
and one television station broadcast[ed] the Judgment live.”285 The
Judgment was also available online via the “Special Court’s website and
the Open Society Justice Initiative funded ‘Charles Taylor Trial’ website.”286
However, the outreach efforts were not without their flaws or obstacles. Initially, the SCSL set up two additional centers to broadcast the
live stream of the proceeding, but due to continuous technical problems,
they were eventually shut down.287 The Charles Taylor trial was thus
streamed in only one of the two courtrooms inside the SCSL compound;
the inaccessibility resulted in few individuals actually watching the trial.288 The SCSL’s website provided a live stream, but it was largely useless outside to the court’s premises due to the poor quality of internet
facilities in Sierra Leone and the regular electricity cuts.289 “Satellite
communications, upon which the court’s video-link depend[ed] [on],
[were] subject to climate interference, technical incidents, or lack of facilities.”290 These limitations were even more pronounced in Liberia.291
These deficiencies were, to some extent, countered by the SCSL’s Outreach Program.292 While these efforts should be commended, the obstacles and failures in the execution of outreach strategies should also
serve as lessons for future international criminal tribunals.
The SCSL legacy activities continue to be an essential part of the
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Cruvellier, supra note 226, at 13.
Id. at 14.
Ninth Annual Report of the President, supra note 224, at 33.
Id.
Id.
Cruvellier, supra note 226, at 15.
Id.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 15.
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court’s operations and should receive continued support from the international community in order to reach its full potential and preserve its
legacy.293 Through its various projects, the SCSL has strengthened the
domestic justice system, served as a model for the rule of law in Sierra
Leone, and transferred valuable skills and knowledge to Sierra Leonean
court staff.294 There are, however, still very real risks to the legacy of the
SCSL, and only time will tell if the SCSL will have the necessary “political and financial support” from the international community to become truly meaningful.295
IV. LESSONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
A. Historical Overview of the International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established by treaty,
the Rome Statute, instead of a U.N. resolution or agreement; as of May
1, 2013, it has 122 state parties to its statute.296 It is the first permanent
international court and the first court with global application.”297 “The
Court is seated in The Hague in the Netherlands298 and is considered a
“court of last resort . . . based on the principle of complementarity.299
The principle of complementarity dictates “that the primary responsibility for exercising jurisdiction over international crimes rests with domestic jurisdictions and that the ICC cannot act unless the country with
jurisdiction over the case is not investigating, prosecuting, or is ‘unwilling or unable genuinely’ to do so.”300
Establishing the ICC “is one of the most important developments

293. Id. at 45.
294. Ninth Annual Report of the President, supra note 224, at 7.
295. Tolbert, supra note 258.
296. Rome Statute came into force on July 1, 2002, after 66 states ratified it. ICC at a
Glance,
INT’L
CRIM.
COURT,
http://www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/about%20the%20court/icc%20at%20a%20glance/Pages/icc%20at%20a%20
glance.aspx; Oosterveld, supra note 241, at 23. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court art. 126, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 1002, 1068 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
297. Cole, supra note 22.
CRIM.
COURT,
http://www2.icc298. About
the
ICC,
INT’L
cpi.int/menus/icc/about%20the%20court/icc%20at%20a%20glance/icc%20at%20a%20glance?la
n=en-GB.
299. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW SERVICES, INTERNATIONAL, HYBRID AND NATIONAL
COURTS
TRYING
INTERNATIONAL
CRIMES
1,
12,
available
at http://wcjp.unicri.it/deliverables/docs/Module_4_International_war_crimes_courts.pdf.
300. Id.
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in international criminal law.”301 From its inception, the ICC “was envisioned as a body that would preside over only those cases of most serious concern to the international community as a whole,” namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crime of aggression.302
The Court is still controversial since powerful states such as the United
States, Russia, China, and India are unwilling to join.303 While some
have argued that the ICC has failed to live up to the high expectations of
the international community, one area that the ICC has shown a great
deal of leadership in is the field of victim’s rights; the ICC has a number
of victim-centered laws designed to empower and include the victims of
the crimes.304 The ICC’s “innovative, victim-centered approach include:
informing victims of decisions that concern them; allowing victims’
participation in proceedings; providing legal aid for the victim’s representation; taking measures for victims’ protection, offering support, assistance, and being able to claim reparation.”305
The ICC’s subject matter, personal, and territorial jurisdictions are
limited. The Court is limited to hearing cases involving four crimes:
crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and the crime of aggression.306 It can hear a case if the crime is committed on the territory
of a State Party to the Rome Statute, if the accused is a national of a
State Party, or if a non-State Party has accepted the jurisdiction of the
ICC with respect to the crime at issue.307 However, if the U.N. Security
Council refers the case to the ICC, these limitations do not apply, and
the ICC can hear cases about crimes originating in or committed by nationals of states that are not parties to the Rome Statute.308 The U.N. Security Council, under its Chapter VII powers—which apply only when
there are threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or an act of aggres301. CRYER, supra note 79, at 144.
302. Susana SaCouto & Katherine Cleary, The Gravity Threshold of the International Criminal Court, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 807, 808 (2007).
303. Sarkin, supra note 68, at 83.
304. T. MARKUS FUNK, VICTIM’S RIGHTS AND ADVOCACY AT THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT, 43 (2010).
305. WADDELL & CLARK, supra note 171, at 66.
306. Rome Statute, supra note 296, art. 1.
307. Rome Statute, art. 12(2); see also id. art. 124 (stating “notwithstanding Article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, a State, on becoming a party to this Statute, may declare that, for a period of
seven years after the entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does not accept the
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in Article 8 when a
crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory. A declaration under
this Article may be withdrawn at any time. The provisions of this Article shall be reviewed at the
Review Conference convened in accordance with Article 123, paragraph 1.”).
308. Id. art. 13(b).
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sion—can also ask the ICC to defer an investigation or prosecution for
renewable periods of up to twelve months.309
The ICC is currently investigating eight situations: Uganda, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur, Sudan, Central African Republic, Kenya, Libya, and Côte d’Voire.310 Four out of the eight ongoing
ICC cases against African individuals were referred to The Hague by
their own governments.311 The cases of Kenya and Côte d’Voire were a
result of the ICC prosecutor’s decision to launch his own investigation.312 Libya and Sudan, both not parties to the Rome Statute, were referred to the ICC by the U.N. Security Council.313 While all the current
situations are in Africa, the Office of the Prosecutor is also conducting
preliminary examinations in a number of situations including Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Colombia, Honduras, Korea, and Nigeria; the
ICC currently holds “all of its trials in The Hague.”314
While there has been some discussion about “moving small parts
of the trials to the countries where the alleged crimes took place,” very
little effort seems focused on making local or regional trials a main
component of the ICC’s framework.315 Furthermore, despite the international community’s recognition of the benefits in on-location trials, due
to security concerns and the lack of effective safeguards in some cases,
the general advantages of holding a proceeding in the country where the
crimes took place—or even a neighboring country—may pose more
risks than benefits. One recent example is the ICC’s involvement in
Kenya. Initially, President Uhuru Kenyatta, Deputy President William
Ruto, and broadcaster Joshua Arap Sang’s trials were scheduled to start
in early April, 2013.316 They were all charged with “crimes against humanity arising out of the post-election violence” that took place in Kenya between 2007 and 2008.317 In February 2013, Kenyan witnesses “re309. Id. art. 16; Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace,
and
Acts
of
Aggression,
United
Nations
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml.
310. Situations and Cases, supra note 26.
311. Id.
312. Sarkin, supra note 68, at 84.
313. Id.
314. Stuart Ford, International Criminal Court and Proximity to the Scene of the Crime:
Does the Rome Statue Permit All of the ICC’s Trials to Take Place at Local or Regional Chambers, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 715, 716 (2009-2010).
315. Id.
316. Kenya: Witnesses Reject ICC Move to Arusha, STAR (Feb. 5, 2013),
http://allafrica.com/stories/201302051231.html?viewall=1.
317. Id.
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jected a proposal to move the Kenyan ICC trials” to the neighboring
country of Tanzania because they still feared for their safety there.318
The year before, Kenyan witnesses “rejected a plan to relocate them to
African countries after the trials are over” because “they need[ed] to
stay in Europe to ensure their safety.”319 These cases highlight the need
to take additional efforts to address the underlying causes of such fears
and to ensure that appropriate and effective safeguards are in place to
protect those who participate in ICC proceedings and investigations.
The ICC completed its first case on March 14, 2012 when it found
Congolese warlord Thomas Lubanga Dyilo “guilty of having committed
the war crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of
15 years and using them to participate actively in hostilities in the
[Democratic Republic of Congo] between September 2002 and August
2003.”320 This trial was the “first test of formal victim participation in an
international criminal trial,” with a total of 129 victims participating
through their legal representatives.321
B. Completion Strategies for the International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute provides very little guidance on how the Court
should close its investigations.322 The ICC will, in time, complete its
work in each of the current situation countries.323 While the permanency
of the ICC does address some of the completion and residual issues that
ad hoc tribunals necessarily face due to their temporary nature, Valerie
Oosterveld, Director of Western University’s Centre for Transitional
Justice and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, notes that the ICC will need to
consider how to handle situations when it decides to “scale down its in-

318. Id.
319. Id.
FOR
THE
INT’L
CRIM.
COURT,
320. Lubanga
Case,
COALITION
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/?mod=drctimelinelubanga.
321. Id.
FOR
THE
INT’L
CRIM.
COURT,
322. Rome
Conference,
COALITION
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=rome (last visited March 22, 2014); see Rebecca J. Hamilton, Closing ICC Investigations: A Second Bite at the Cherry for Complementarity?, HUMAN RIGHTS
PROGRAM
1,
9‒10
(May
2012),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/documents/Hamilton.pdf. (Some have maintained that
Article 53(3) b of the Rome Statute, which allows the pre-trial chamber to review a prosecutors’
decision to open an investigation also allows for a review of the prosecutor’s decision to close an
investigation. Others argue that Article 53(3) b, as it pertains to the closure of investigations, is
ambiguous).
323. The International Criminal Court and the Closure of the Time-Limited International
and Hybrid Criminal Tribunals, supra note 241, at 14.
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vestigatory and outreach presence in a situation country in response to a
lack of international action on arrest warrants.”324 Oosterveld suggests
that “[i]f the ICC does scale down its [operation] in a situation country,
it must also plan for future rapid scaling up of investigatory, defense
and outreach presence if fugitives are captured and transferred to the
ICC.”325
Completion strategies need to be part of the ICC’s initial considerations when the ICC begins its involvement in a situation country. Realistically, however, there are limitations to the amount of detail that can
be included in such strategies; for instance, it is often difficult to predict
the number of trial and appeals there will be during the early stages of
involvement.326 That said, planning the process by which the Court will
close its investigations and end its proceedings as well as planning how
the information is gathered and interpreted into an eventual strategy
document is important to develop at the earliest stage possible.327 Such a
strategy should address the ICC’s responsibilities after the proceedings
are completed, or in other words, its residual activities.328 This information should also be disseminated to the affected communities as well
as the international community early on to establish appropriate expectations and understanding of the entire process. Some have suggested
that the first draft of the completion strategy document should “be circulated to all interested parties for information and comment” and updated
biannually.329
Additionally, to keep “external interested parties” updated on
“progress and long term thinking,” the ICC should consider suggestions
made about conducting presentations and explanations when meeting
with international and national NGOs as well as with other stakeholders,
such as local civil society organizations.330 Using outreach programs to
explain early on that the Court is undertaking responsibility for activities after the end of judicial proceedings will help preserve a positive
legacy for the ICC and increase awareness among the communities
about what resources would be available to them, such as witness protection programs and access to archived information. By ensuring affected communities are able to understand and stay apprised of the
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.

Oosterveld, supra note 241, at 29.
Id.
Vincent, supra note 4, at 146.
Id.
Id. at 147.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 149.
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ICC’s advancement, the ICC can empower local communities, bring
perpetrators of human rights to justice, and strengthen a nation’s justice
system, thereby serving its goal to end impunity and prevent future
atrocities.
C. Residual Mechanisms for the International Criminal Court
Although the ad hoc tribunals residual mechanisms are still in their
infancy, the awareness and planning that went into their formation creates valuable knowledge and experience which the ICC can build on
and tailor to match its own specific residual issues. As previously stated,
the ICC’s permanency does address some of the residual issues that ad
hoc institutions faced; for example, the ICC would not need to formulate a mechanism to prosecute fugitives post-closure.331 Additionally, it
would not need to concern itself with the issue of transferring cases to
an impartial forum that can guarantee a fair trial.332 Despite that, other
residual issues still remain. After the ICC proceedings end, the ICC
would still have ongoing responsibilities to protect victims and witnesses, ensure that sentences remain enforced, and that affected populations
have access to archives.
In response to these issues, the ICC’s Assembly of State Parties
Committee on Budget and Finance has stated that “appropriate consideration should be given to the role that the field offices are expected to
play and how, at the conclusion of Court proceedings in a given area,
any residual issues should be handled.”333
The choice to keep the principal seats of the residual ICTY, ICTR,
and the SCSL in The Hague, Arusha, and Freetown, respectively,
helped ensure continuity with the support of existing host city relations.334 For future residual mechanisms, however, the residual activities
should always, whenever possible, take place in the situation country as
it allows the mechanism to become embedded in the communities’ social fabrics.335 Furthermore, this helps the communities learn to accept
331. Oosterveld, supra note 241, at 29; see Oosthuizen & Schaeffer, supra note 41, at 53
(highlighting the issue ad hoc institutions face when deciding how to try fugitives post-closure).
332. Id.
333. International Criminal Court Assembly of States Parties, Report of the Committee on
Budget and Finance on the Work of Its Twelfth Session, ¶ 73, ICC-ASP/8/5 (May 13, 2009),
available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8/ICC-ASP-8-5-ENG.pdf [hereinafter
2009 Report of the Committee on Budget and Finance].
334. See Oosthuizen & Schaeffer, supra note 40, at 63 (discussing the advantages of not relocating the ICTY, ICTR, and the SCSL).
335. ICTJ’s SCSL Legacy Podcast Series: Alison Smith, supra note 216.
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the judgments and arrests made by the Court.336 Therefore, the Court
should follow civil society’s suggestions and seek to increase its field
presence and utilize field offices to carry out residual work after the judicial proceedings are completed.
By developing its own archival system, the ICC can also learn
from the experiences of ad hoc tribunals.337 For example, the ICTY and
ICTR failed to “adopt common public [versus] confidential security
classification systems from the beginning of their existence,” thus an
additional, and even avoidable, burden was created on the process of
preparing the archives for closure.338 The delayed availability of information to the public could foreseeably cause distrust, frustration, and
disengagement impacting the Court’s legacy.
The ICC can learn from these experiences and employ mechanisms and procedures from the beginning of a case to keep track of document sources and to “ensure consistency in the way information is
classified and processed within the different organs.”339 Thus, the ICC
would prevent having additional work for itself, but also use this archive as an opportunity to establish best practices. Additionally, “[c]lear
policies should be developed from the outset” of the court’s activities in
order to “facilitat[e] the legacy of court archives” and establish “which
documents will be retained and where they . . . [will] be kept.340 Access
to archives is important to prevent “historical revisionism and to facilitate historical research.”341 Therefore, should the ICC choose to keep its
case archives in The Hague, it is essential that affected populations also
have access to these documents. The ICC should make sure to consider
this issue during the beginning of its involvement.
In regards to the issue of victim and witness protection, the distance of the ICC from the current situation in the countries pose an obvious obstacle since the location of victim and witness protection mechanisms are important. These mechanisms have proven to work best
when it is physically situated where the crimes took place.342 Currently,
all eight of the ICC’s cases involve states in Africa.343 If the ICC choos336. Id.
337. Oosterveld, supra note 241, at 30.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Vincent, supra note 4, at 153.
341. Oosterveld, supra note 241, at 27.
342. See generally Boas & Oosthuizen, supra note 30, at 10-13.
343. Michael Birnbaum, African LeadersComplain of Bias at the ICC as Kenya Trials get
Underway, WASH. POST (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/african-
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es to not establish field offices in each of these situation countries to
help facilitate victim and witness protection, it should at the very least
ensure that some form of regional coordination with field offices is in
the nearby countries.
In order to preserve the Court’s legacy, outreach regarding residual
mechanisms is essential. Outreach efforts to explain witness programs
in order to overcome witnesses’ fears, is crucial to its efficacy. Without
knowledge of the availability of the witness protection programs and
their capabilities, it is unlikely that even the most capable witness protection programs can be successful.344 Effective outreach efforts will not
only increase witness involvement in trials, but can also foster the possibility of allowing local trials if witnesses understand that their identities will be protected and that they have relocation as a possibility. As
highlighted in the instance of the SCSL, holding trials where the crimes
occurred, or at least, closer to where the crimes occurred, has numerous
benefits. For example, according to a recent legacy survey, the impact
of the SCSL’s work was much greater in Sierra Leone, where the court
was located, than in neighboring Liberia, which was also greatly impacted by the conflict.345
D. The International Criminal Court’s Legacy
The ICC is still struggling to establish relevance in affected communities.346 While the ICC has acknowledged the need to tackle legacy
issues and to engage in “discussions about completion strategies, residual functions and legacy in the other tribunals and courts . . . to build[]
on their experience and knowledge,”347 it seems that the ICC is nevertheless repeating its predecessors’ mistakes by not planning for its legacy early on in its activities.348
Because “[h]olding trials within the concerned state allows the
leaders-complain-of-bias-at-icc-as-kenya-trials-are-underway/2013/12/05/0c52fc7a-56cb-11e3bdbf-097ab2a3dc2b_story.html [hereinafter African Leaders complain of bias].
344. Supra Section IV (discussing cases in Kenya where witnesses were afraid to return to
their countries after testifying).
345. Impact and Legacy Survey, supra note 217, at 2.
346. The Field Presence of the ICC, NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE,
http://www.npwj.org/ICC/Field-Presence-ICC.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2014) [hereinafter The
Field Presence of the ICC].
347. International Criminal Court Assembly of States Parties, Report on Review of Field Operations, ¶ 23 (July 30, 2010), ICC-ASP/9/12, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/3358BCD66DC3-42D6-91F8-ABC5FFED3CA6/0/ICCASP912ENG.pdf [hereinafter 2010 Report on Review
of Field Operations].
348. Cole, supra note 22, at 3.
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public to participate far more closely in the proceedings, and the proceedings themselves can have important effects on issues such as truth
and reconciliation,”349 the ICC must begin to prioritize the implementation of locally based activities to ensure its efficacy, efficiency, and legacy so that the disconnect caused by distance can be resolved.350 If the
ICC fails to consider such issues, it will not only undermine the Court’s
work and legacy, but can also have greater repercussions on the legitimacy and integrity in the ever-evolving system of international criminal
justice.351 If the Court does not play an educative and preventive function by establishing a process “to promote reconciliation and ensure
nonrepetition of human rights violations in the future, then the same
events that led to the violations are likely to reoccur.”352 The Court
needs to “begin elaborating its vision for what it intends to accomplish
in any given country, what legacy it will leave, how it will assure that
legacy and what resources it will need to do so.”353
The prosecutions made by international courts are often at risk of
not properly resonating with the affect communities and victims.354
Since the ICC is a headquarter-based institution located in the Hague,
civil society groups, such as the NGO No Peace Without Justice, have
“consistently advocated for the ICC to become closer to the victims,
communities and other stakeholders affected by its work in situation
countries.”355 The ICC currently has a minimal presence in these situation countries, which make it difficult for the Court to carry out its dayto-day operations, create and maintain meaningful interactions with the
affected communities, and contribute anything of significance to the
impact of the Court in these countries.356 In order to increase ownership
in its proceedings, the ICC should engage with a variety of different actors, such as civil society groups, local bar associations, victim groups,
the diplomatic community, and the international aid organizations,
throughout the court’s involvement in the concerned country.357
In addition to increasing ownership, the ICC, through the “demon349. Sarkin, supra note 68, at 91.
350. See ICTJ’s SCSL Legacy Podcast Series: Alison Smith, supra note 216.
351. See generally The Field Presence of the ICC, supra note 346.
352. Sarkin, supra note 68, at 97.
353. The Field Presence of the ICC, supra note 346.
354. Elizabeth Evenson, Gaddafi Prosecution Can Help ICC Complete Unfinished Business,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/sep/15/gaddafiprosecuiton-icc-unfinished-business.
355. The Field Presence of the ICC, supra note 346.
356. Id.
357. Vincent, supra note 4, at 151‒52.
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stration effect” of the norms and values of due process and international
human rights, “may be able to have an impact on domestic systems and
contribute to a culture of human rights.”358 Education and dissemination
of information is critical because a lack of regional knowledge about
trials diminishes the importance of precedent in the region.359 According
to ICTY’s former Chief Prosecutor, Justice Richard Goldstone, “the judicial process is insufficient alone to satisfy the human need for knowing the truth of a tragic series of events. In addition to criminal prosecution, it is necessary for a damaged society to arrive at a wider
understanding of the causes of its suffering.”360 Therefore, public education during and after the ICC proceedings should be essential components in legacy planning. To assist with educating affected communities, the ICC should try and replicate the ICTY’s project of making its
case documents accessible by also publishing and distributing its judgments in local languages.361
Outreach programs are not only necessary for the ICC to be effective and efficient, but also play an important role in preserving the
Court’s legacy. “Sustained dialogue with victims and affected populations can help reduce frustration and disappointment,” in addition to
helping those communities take ownership of trials.362 Despite the importance of these activities, the ICC’s in-country activities have been
“poorly equipped to respond to unfolding political developments,”
which has led to common remark by those in the situation countries that
“the Court is not present.”363 In addition, the Court’s ability to monitor
and analyze outreach is limited by the fact that the function is coordinated and based from the Hague; it has been argued that the ICC should
try to involve “core partners at the country level” to increase the effectiveness of its outreach efforts.364
The ICC should look to the experience of the SCSL, particularly
the Charles Taylor trial (which took place in the Hague), and seek to
utilize some of the SCSL court’s outreach strategies. The SCSL engaged the Prosecution team in its outreach efforts by having Chief Prosecutor David Crane travel across the country to the affected communi-

358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.

Id. at 153‒54.
See generally The Field Presence of the ICC, supra note 346.
Sarkin, supra note 68, at 93.
Id. at 96.
WADDELL & CLARK supra note 171, at 68.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 68.
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ties.365 It was important for David Crane to personally speak with those
in the affected communities about the events that had occurred and have
them meet the prosecutor working on their behalf.366 The SCSL also
used more community volunteers than outreach officers, which had several advantages. First, most of the volunteers were unpaid, which increased outreach without increasing the SCSL’s limited budget. Second,
these individuals were far more familiar with the customs and culture of
the communities with whom they were engaging. Third, particularly in
areas with different tribal dialects, these volunteers were able to communicate directly with the populations rather than speak through a
translator. If the ICC trains local volunteers from the affected communities, it can create an effective local presence for the court as well as a
participatory mechanism for the local community.367 The ICC should also consider using the media to educate the public, such as broadcasting
its trials and sharing knowledge of how they work while taking into account what limited infrastructure may be available to disseminate such
information.
The ICC faces risks of its work being undermined each time it fails
to reach out and explain why the Court made certain choices. An example of such failure derives from the ICC’s first trial; despite the many
allegations of murder and sexual violence, Thomas Lubanga was ultimately charged with only three war crimes: conscripting children under
the age of fifteen years old into armed groups; enlisting children into
armed groups, and using children to participate actively in armed conflict.368 During the beginning stages of investigation, Congolese authorities unexpectedly detained Lubanga; it was also unclear as to how long
they would be able to hold him in custody.369 At that time, the ICC prosecutor had only gathered sufficient evidence in regards to the child recruitment charges, but not the sexual offenses or murder charges.370 The
ICC had chose to employ a prosecutorial strategy by choosing to charge
the accused based on the strength of the evidence against the accused
365.
366.
367.
368.

Wu, supra note 133, at 70-71.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Thomas Lubanga at the International Criminal Court, INT’L JUSTICE MONITOR: A
PROJECT OF THE OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, http://www.ijmonitor.org/thomas-lubangabackground (last visited Sept. 21, 2014).
369. Deconstructing Lubanga: The ICC’s First Case: the Trial and Conviction of Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo, AMERICAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS COALITION FOR THE INT’L
CRIM. COURT (AMICC) at 3, http://www.amicc.org/docs/Deconstructing_Lubanga.pdf. [hereinafter Deconstructing Lubanga].
370. Id.
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and how much could be proved.371 It should be noted here that such
prosecutorial discretion is not without checks and balances by the pretrial chambers.372 Despite the Court’s system of checks and balances, the
general population unaware of the strategy was left frustrated without
explanation for why certain charges were not pursued by the prosecution.373 This left a sense of injustice to the affected communities; by not
disclosing the underlying goodwill, an obstacle to reconciliation was
created, one that may lead to the cycle of violence being left unbroken.374
Accordingly, the ICC’s judicial functions, non-judicial functions,
and its long-term legacy would be improved by maintaining a stronger
and permanent representation in situation countries.375 As of 2010,
85.6% of ICC personnel are allocated to headquarters and 14.4% to situation countries.376 While the ICC is operating under tight budgetary restrictions, the Court is at risk of paralysis if it is unable to execute its essential functions, some of which necessarily require a field presence.
For example, the predicament created by the ICC’s distance from the
current situation countries has led to some hostility and a loss of community support in Africa.377
While the ICC can learn from the lessons of the ad hoc criminal
tribunals, it will have to create its own approach to legacy. Because of
the global reach of the ICC, it cannot just create a singular legacy strategy for the entire court. It will have to work with the individual situation countries early on to create a legacy strategy by consulting key
stakeholders and victims and representatives from affected communities.378
V. CONCLUSION
The creation of international criminal tribunals has greatly advanced the international community’s mission to end impunity and establish foundations for lasting peace. While that may be true, if the in371. Deconstructing Lubanga, supra note 369, at 3.
372. Wu, supra note 133, at 73.
373. Thomas Lubanga at the International Criminal Court, supra note 368.
374. Wu, supra note 133, at 72-73.
375. See generally Impact and Legacy Survey, supra note 217, at 14 (“This indicates the importance of international courts and tribunals having a strong presence in the countries in which
they are investigating and bringing cases and stands as an important lesson for the future.”).
376. 2010 Report on Review of Field Operations, supra note 347, at 8.
377. For further discussion, see Section VI. (POSTSCRIPT) of this article.
378. See generally The Field Presence of the ICC, supra note 346.
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ternational community does not begin prioritizing completion strategies,
residual mechanisms, and legacy planning, these advancements are at
risk of being undone. While the need to leave a legacy is now firmly accepted as part of the Unite Nations policy, how these activities are to be
incorporated remains uncertain and inconsistent.379
The ICC must consider not only how it enters a community torn
apart by atrocities, but also be mindful of how it intends to leave it. The
ICC will have to address many of the same residual issues and legacy
questions that the ad hoc criminal tribunals have previously faced and
are still handling. Similar to the obstacles that ICTR and ICTY faced as
a result of their distance from the affected populations, the ICC will
have to make additional efforts so that the affected communities have
the opportunity to take ownership over the trials with the goal of establishing a basis for peace and reconciliation. Just as the completion of the
ad hoc criminal tribunals, the ICC’s completion of judicial proceeding
will not only impact the “sustainability of peace and the rule of law
within the countries concerned, but also the extent of public support and
legitimacy for international justice in general.”380
Accordingly, policy priorities need to be formulated early on, emphasizing the creation of a strong legacy programs so that the focus is
not solely on its trials or convictions. The ICC should begin drafting a
legacy strategy plan before its proceedings commence, outlining community needs and goals as well as identifying potential problems in advance to tackle. Legacy programs need to focus on increasing its engagement with domestic institutions, the training of the country’s
domestic justice sector personnel, particularly prosecutors, attorneys,
judges, and magistrates, as well as working on establishing a relationship with the situation country (and its surrounding states).381 While
scarceness of resources may lead the ICC to try to minimize these efforts and initiate the implementation of its residual functions only after
the completion of proceedings, short-changing legacy efforts puts whatever success the Court may have had at grave risk of being undermined
or undone. Therefore, in order for the ICC to reach its full potential, it
must create a completion strategy that plans the necessary residual
mechanisms, which will ultimately impact the Court’s legacy. To establish a positive legacy, it is not enough to bring certain perpetrators to
justice; it is also necessary that the affected communities impacted by
379.
380.
381.

Sarkin, supra note 68, at 96.
Reiger, supra note 2, at 5.
Suma, supra note 28, at 3 (discussing the SCSL).
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the ICC’s work, and the international community as a whole, see and
understand that justice is being done.
VI. POSTSCRIPT
At the time of writing, the ICC faced arguably the most important
public perception battle in its history. In 2013, the ICC’s announced that
it lacked sufficient evidence to proceed in its high profile case against
Kenya’s current President, Uhuru Kenyatta.382 ICC Prosecutor Fatou
Bensouda explained that she could no longer rely on the two key witnesses she needed to try the Kenyan President because one witness was
no longer willing to testify and the other witness confessed to having
provided false evidence.383 After the announcement, a poll showed that
the percentage of Kenyans who supported the ICC process fell from
55% in April 2012 to 39%.384 At Assembly of State Parties in November
2013, Kenyan leaders had also won concessions that essentially made it
easier for them to forgo some court sessions and attend others remotely
by video link rather than being required to come in person at The
Hague.385 Some Human Rights Advocates have argued that the weight
these cases have placed on the ICC has resulted in changes that will undermine the entire court.386
The ICC’s involvement in Kenya began in March 2010, when the
ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II granted the “prosecution authorisation to
open an investigation proprio motu in the situation of Kenya.”387 In
2011, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William
Ruto were indicted on charges of encouraging violence after the disputed elections in December 2007, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,100 people.388 The President and Deputy President unsuccessfully sought permission from both the ICC and U.N. Security Council to
“skip ICC proceedings in the name of national security and pushed for
immunity from prosecution for sitting heads of state.”389 In fact, on the
382. Rick Gladstone, Kenya President’s Trial Near Collapse, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 20,
2013),
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/world/2013/12/20/trial-kenyan-president-maycollapsing/LG30B2TkSM9UTT9w2CBCZO/story.html.
383. Id.
384. Tomas Zak, Kenyatta in Court: The ICC Needs to Start Winning Some Public PercepAFRICA
PRESS
(Nov.
12,
2013),
tion
Battles,
THINK
http://thinkafricapress.com/kenya/manipulation-and-misinformation-kenyatta-and-icc-question.
385. See African Leaders complain of bias, supra note 343.
386. The Intersection of Law, Policy, and Practice, supra note 216.
387. Situations and Cases, supra note 26.
388. Birnbaum, supra note 343.
389. Id.
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day of the Nairobi Westgate mall attack, Deputy President Ruto was
permitted to leave The Hague and return to Kenya to coordinate a response; Kenyan officials have argued that the ICC prosecutions were
distracting their leaders from counter-terrorism efforts.390 Eventually, as
stated above, the Kenyan leaders succeeded; Deputy President Ruto will
be permitted to forgo attendance for part of his trial.
After the Westgate attack, Kenya helped convene an October
summit of the African Union, where the ICC’s focus on Africa was
condemned.391 At that summit, Hailemariam Dessalegn, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia and current African Union chairman, “read out the union’s collective complaint against the ICC’s “unfair treatment” of Africans, criticizing the ICC “as a condescending political instrument
targeting Africa and Africans;” Kenya’s President, Uhuru Kenyatta,
called the ICC a racist “toy of declining imperial powers.”392 Observers
noted that, “African leaders have viewed the [Kenyan] case with increasing bitterness and criticism, contending that the court is preoccupied with pursuing cases in Africa exclusively.”393 The summit ended
with a joint recommendation that President Kenyatta be able to skip his
trial at the ICC, scheduled to begin in November 2014.394 Despite the
public uproar, the AU states—which comprise of thirty-four out of 122
State Parties to the Rome Statue—did not reach an agreement regarding
whether to withdraw from the ICC.395
This development is just the latest of many struggles with Kenya
that are now bringing into question not only the future of those cases,
but also of the AU’s general support of the ICC. The controversy has
added momentum to other ICC battles, such as the ICC’s case against
Omer Hassan al-Bashir, the President of Sudan, Abdel-Rahim Mohamed Hussein, Defense Minister of Sudan, Ahmed Haroun, the governor of North Kordofan, and militia leader Ali Kushayb.396 Al-Bashir,
who became the first head of state targeted by the ICC in 2008, was
charged with committing genocide in the Darfur region. He has accused
390. Id.
391. Id.
392. Sreeram Chaulia, The International Controversy Court: Why its Selective Justice is
Failing Africa and the World, RT (Oct. 13, 2013), http://rt.com/op-edge/africa-internationalcontroversy-court-183.
393. Gladstone, supra note 382.
394. Chaulia, supra note 392.
395. Id.
396. Sudan Accuses ICC of Playing “proxy political foe”, SUDAN TRIBUNE (Dec. 12, 2013),
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=49167.
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the court of having a bias against Africans and rejected the jurisdiction
of the ICC by asserting that it is not a party to the Rome Statute. 397
Only time will tell the outcome of these cases and the impact that
these events will have on the ICC’s legacy. If nothing is done to ensure
that affected communities have ownership over these cases, the ICC’s
legacy will inevitably be in peril.

397. Id.; see also Omar al-Bashir Charged with Dafur Genocide, GUARDIAN, (July 12,
2010), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/12/bashir-charged-with-darfur-genocide.

